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I. Introduction
While the ordinary citizen may think that a given conflict
constitutes a "war," the popular conception of war clearly is different
from war in the legal sense. What seems to be a state of war to many
observers may, from a legal standpoint, be a state of peace. It is
important to ascertain whether war in the formal, legal sense exists
because various legal consequences attach if there is a state of war.
For example, in order to know whether certain wartime legislation is
operative, or to determine when wartime exclusionary clauses apply
in life insurance contracts, one must know, with as much exactness as
possible, whether a state of war exists and, if so, when it started and
when it ended.
The political branches of government, as well as the courts, have
recognized the distinction between a state of war in the legal sense
(Legal War) and war in the pragmatic, de facto sense.2 Military
actions such as reprisal, defensive action, humanitarian intervention,
"pacific blockade," or other forcible measures short of war might
1. The existence of a "true" war is referred to variously in the literature as
"war," "war in the legal sense," "de jure war,". "war in the sense of international law"
and "war in the formal sense." See AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION 20 n.4 (1979). For purposes of readability, this article will periodically
refer to war in the legal sense as Legal War.
2. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4
Dall.) 37 (1800); Quincy Wright, When Does War Exist?, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 362, 362
(1932).
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occur on a considerable scale, yet because these are "confined in
[their] nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and
things... [these are] more properly termed imperfect war. ... "'
Moreover, "[a] state of war may exist without active hostilities, and
active hostilities may exist without a state of war."
4
Whether a state of war exists between belligerent states is more
often than not far from certain. Very few wars are waged pursuant to
a formal declaration of war. American courts seem never to have
agreed on a standard for determining the existence of a state of war.
To a large extent, judicial definitions and standards turn on the
context in which the question arises. Thus, as discussed in this article,
situations that will activate the "time of war" provisions in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (Uniform Code)5 may not
necessarily operate to constitute a "time of war" under life insurance
policies that contain clauses denying or curtailing benefits when death
is a result of war or when the insured is in the armed services in time
of war.6
Further complicating the problem, as discussed in this article, is
the fact that governments have engaged in significant armed conflicts
while vigorously denying that a state of war has existed between
3. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 40.
4. Wright, supra note 2, at 363.
5. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2003).
6. For cases pertaining to World War II, see, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion,
158 F.2d 260, 264 (10th Cir. 1946) stating:
We can discern no demonstrable difference in the supposition and the actual
facts, and we therefore conclude that the formal declaration by the Congress
on December 8th was not an essential prerequisite to a political
determination of the existence of a state of war commencing with the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
See also, Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 37 Haw. 208 (1945) (formal declaration of
Congress necessary); Rosenau v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 145 P.2d 227 (Idaho
1944) (formal declaration of Congress necessary); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins.
Co., 25 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 1943) (formal declaration of Congress necessary).
For cases pertaining to the Korean conflict, see, e.g., Beley v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 95 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (formal declaration of
Congress necessary); Harding v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 221 (Pa. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 812 (1953) (formal declaration of Congress necessary); W. Reserve
Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1953) (formal declaration of
Congress not necessary).
In more recent years, insurance companies have attempted to avoid these
conflicting results by providing more specific language in policies by using phrases
such as "during combat," or "acts of war, both declared and undeclared." See Notes,
Military Law-"In Time of War" Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice: An
Elusive Standard, 67 MICH. L. REv. 841, 846 n.41 (1969).
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them-notwithstanding the obvious state of belligerency, the
engagement of troops and the loss of lives. The motivation for states
to deny that war exists between them runs the gamut from the desire
to maintain normal diplomatic, commercial and legal relations
without interruption, to concern about the psychological impact on
the public if a war is acknowledged to exist in the legal sense. And if
a state of war is admitted, the date on which the war began can be far
from certain. Compounding the problem is the fact is that most wars
are undeclared wars so that opinions as to the date on which a
particular war began may be diverse.
As discussed in this article, the question of whether a given
conflict constitutes a state of war-and if so when it began and
ended-may be framed by different courts for different purposes.
Generally speaking, military courts tend to take a more expansive
view for the purpose of applying war status provisions in the Uniform
Code, but nonetheless courts-martial have arrived at varying
conclusions under similar facts as to whether wartime status existed.
Civil courts may take a somewhat diverse, ad hoc, approach as to
whether a war exists and, if so, the duration of a war for purposes of
interpreting municipal and contract law. There is significant
disagreement, particularly in civil courts, as to the weight given to
various criteria such as statements from the political branches of
government, the number of troops deployed or the number of
casualties, in deciding whether a state of war exists.
Finally, there is substantial disagreement as to when a war has
ended. When a war ends is often a greater puzzle than when a war
starts because the cessation of hostilities or an armistice does not, in
and of itself, constitute the end of war under customary international
law. Nevertheless, courts, both military and civil, may often depart
from traditional views on this point, often in an effort to avoid harsh
results.
This article discusses the problems of determining when war
exists, when it ends and why these concerns are important. Part II
outlines the important military and civil reasons for establishing
whether or not a state of war exists and discusses why there is a
general political and diplomatic reluctance to admit a state of war
despite evidence of a de facto war. Part III addresses the formalities
associated in history with respect to declarations of war, and then
turns to the question of when a declaration of war exists, problems
with ambiguity and retroactivity of war declarations and problems of
unilateral war declarations. It also discusses diplomatic powers of the
[Vol. 27:221
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President that can lead to war and examines the War Powers
Resolution and its impact as to whether a state of war exists. Part IV
considers military operations other than war that may lead to war but
do not constitute Legal War. It discusses the role of commanders in
the field in construing whether a state of war has begun, and how
third states not a party to a conflict might determine that a state of
war exists. Part V turns to case studies of states that have denied the
existence of war despite the presence of military battles, and the way
courts have interpreted these conflicts. Part VI discusses three
modern American case studies and asks whether the American Civil
War, the Korean conflict or the Vietnam War were wars in the legal
sense.
Part VII examines "time of war" provisions of the Uniform
Code, and how these provisions have played out in various conflicts.
It also analysizes how courts have interpreted "time of war"
provisions in life insurance policies. Part VIII discusses the "political
act test" for determining when a war ceases to exist. And Part IX
concludes with remarks on how the question of when war exists and
ends might be clarified.
H. Reasons for Clarifying Whether a State of War Exists
A. In General
War has been described as a judicial procedure, a "litigation"
between nations by which states desirous of obtaining redress for
wrongs or settling disputes resort to self-help to administer justice and
punishment after available means of peaceful resolution have been
exhausted.7 War exists when peace between states has ended and a
certain quantum of hostilities has commenced. How prolonged or
embattled the conflict must be, how extensive the casualties, before a
state of war exists in the legal sense, is the subject of significant
controversy.
One may well wonder why the distinction between war in the
formal sense and conflicts that fall short of war is necessary. Isn't it
absurd or, at best, highly obfuscatory, to make a distinction between
one kind of battle and another when, in either instance, troops are
deployed, casualties incurred, international rules of jus in bello
7. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
21(1963).
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observed and prisoners of war captured? To answer this concern, I
would refer to the following passage of Ian Brownlie:
In the view of most of the governments there were substantial
reasons of policy for avoiding a state of war while at the same time
using the desired amount of coercion. In the era of constitutional
government the executive was usually bound to observe time-
consuming and politically embarrassing procedures before recourse
to 'war'. The process involved preparation of public opinion and
the rallying of sufficient support in the legislative assembly.
Recourse to 'war' incurred a certain odium; 'war' was a term which
had acquired a deep psychological and emotional significance.
'War' implied a full-scale combat which offended pacific sentiment
and was wasteful of lives and a nation's resources. Furthermore, if
a government admitted the existence of a state of war third states
could, without embarrassment, demand observance of neutral
rights and were themselves under various legal duties. The 'state of
war' involved a termination of commercial intercourse between the
contending states and the invalidation or suspension of treaties.'
Thus, distinguishing between a state of war and other kinds of
conflict involving the use of force, such as reprisals, retaliations or
interventions, has substantial diplomatic implications. The moment
that Legal War starts, there are certain profound political,
psychological and international consequences: diplomatic relations
are cut off; trading, commercial transactions, contracts and debts with
the enemy are suspended;9 treaty obligations are suspended between
the belligerents; vast emergency powers may be deployed
domestically; ° and legal relations between neutral states and the
8. Id. at 27.
9. The Trading with the Enemy Act (the Act), makes it unlawful for any person
in the United States to directly or indirectly engage in or attempt to engage in a
broad range of trade or commercial transactions with an enemy or ally of an enemy
of the United States. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2003). Under the Act, the word
"enemy" is deemed to mean any individual, resident or entity of any nation with
which the United States is at war, and the government of any nation with which the
United States is at war (or any political or municipal subdivisions thereof) and its
agents and officers. See id. § 2. The Act defines "the beginning of the war" as
designated by formal declarations of war by Congress or the existence of a state of
war. See id. It defines "end of the war" to mean the date on which there is a
proclamation of exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace, or such earlier date
as the President declares by proclamation. See id. Thus, the Act specifically defines
when a war begins and when a war ends for purposes of trading with the enemy.
10. For example, in the course of Operation Enduring Freedom irregular
combatants who were captured by allied forces were declared to be subject to
military tribunals and exempt from the prisoner-of-war status conferred by the
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belligerents are altered.
For example the existence of war affects certain naval rights
including blockades and the right to "visit and search" other vessels.
If a war exists, a blockade is a right of the belligerents. 2 That is,
before there can be a blockade, and the possibility of capture under
international law for violation or attempted violation of a blockade
(and giving jurisdiction in prize court), there must be war." Further,
in time of war, warships of the belligerent states are entitled conduct
a "visit and search" of certain vessels. 4 The purpose of the visit and
search is to determine whether a vessel flying a neutral flag is really a
neutral vessel and, if so, whether there are reasonable grounds to
believe the vessel is engaged in some type of activity, such as breach
of a blockade or the transport of contraband or other service in
violation of the laws of neutrality, which could subject the vessel to
seizure and condemnation by a prize court. 5 In time of war, the
belligerent's right of visit and search may be conducted either on the
high seas or in the territorial waters of either belligerent, but not in
the territorial waters of neutral states. Any vessel met on the high
seas, regardless of flag, may be ordered by a belligerent to submit to a
visit in order to search for contraband or unneutral service, and to
submit them to national prize courts for condemnation.6
In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court described the change in
the mutual relation of states in time of war as follows:
The legal consequences resulting from a state of war between two
countries at this day are well understood.... The people of the two
Geneva Conventions of 1949.
11. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 687-88 (1862) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting); JAMES ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 34-35 (1945).
12. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 635.
13. Id. at 644. In fact, history shows that the institution of a blockade can serve,
in and of itself, as an event that institutes war. President Lincoln had, without
authorization from Congress, directed the blockade of Southern ports on April 19
and April 27, 1861. See EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS
277-78 (3d ed. 1948). This appears to have been a substitute for a declaration of war
or, at any rate, an act evidencing a state of undeclared war. See Clyde Eagleton, The
Form and Function of the Declaration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 19, 25 (1938).
14. This right of visit and search is distinct from the peacetime right, covered by
Art. 22 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, the main purpose of which
is to verify the vessel's flag, particularly as an aid to the suppression of piracy and
slave-trading.
15. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1126 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 3d ed. 1997), "Prize Law," at (c) Visit and search.
16. Wright, supra note 2, at 363.
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countries become immediately the enemies of each other-all
intercourse commercial or otherwise between them unlawful-all
contracts existing at the commencement of the war suspended, and
all made during its existence utterly void. The insurance of
enemies' property, the drawing of bills of exchange or purchase on
the enemies' country, and remission of bills or money to it are
illegal and void. Existing partnerships between citizens or subjects
of the two countries are dissolved, and, in fine, interdiction of trade
and intercourse direct or indirect is absolute and complete by the
mere force and effect of war itself. All the property of the people
of the two countries on land or sea are subject to capture and
confiscation by the adverse party as enemies' property, with certain
qualifications as it respects property on land .... all treaties
between the belligerent parties are annulled. The ports of the
respective countries may be blockaded, and letters of marque and
reprisal granted as rights of war ....
B. Political and Diplomatic Reluctance to Admit a State of War
The existence of an armed conflict alone does not suffice to
create a time of war, for to rely on armed conflict alone would suggest
that every incident, each reprisal, each crisis, each incident in which
the military is called in to preserve the peace during a domestic civil
disorder-is a time of war. Common sense tells us that not every act
of hostility creates a state of war between nations. There are
numerous political and diplomatic reasons why states wish to avoid
the disruption and embarrassment of admitting that a state of war
exists, even in the face of obvious belligerencies. First, nations are
reluctant to declare war or admit that a state of hostilities constitutes
a Legal War because of the efforts of the international community to
outlaw war as an acceptable means of resolving disputes between
states.'8 Second, there is the desire not to interrupt the operation of
treaty arrangements which are inevitably suspended or modified in
time of war, particularly if the war is a formally declared one. 9 Third,
states are reluctant to admit a state of war because there is a greater
opportunity for the processes of mediation and conciliation on the
part of third states to work if, officially, there is no war. Moreover, if
17. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 687 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Robert Layton, The Effect of Measures Short of War on Treaties, 30
U. CHI. L. REV. 96 (1962); see also Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War, 19 AM. J.
INT'L L. 76 (1925).
19. See, e.g., Layton, supra note 18.
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there is no Legal War, then it is possible to work out a temporary or
permanent plan for peaceful relations without the delays incident to a
formal treaty of peace.
[T]he extreme anxiety which is shown everywhere in the history of
modern diplomacy to avoid coarseness or bluntness of expression,
the desire not to provoke, which makes it a point of honor
delicately to hint at possible or intended war, and combined with
this the eager wish, even at the last moment, to arrange terms of
reconciliation, has led in several instances to very curious results.
Thus ... what has been on one side intended as an ultimatum, to be
followed under certain contingencies and after a certain lapse of
time by a declaration of war, has been, according to the strength or
weakness of the power receiving it, treated sometimes as an actual
declaration of war, and thereupon at once acted upon; sometimes it
has been regarded as only a more than ordinarily threatening
communication, suggesting a more active stage of diplomacy; so
that in either event a virtually complete surprise has been effected
when hostilities actually commenced.20
C. "Time of War" Provisions in Military Law
The question of whether a state of war exists is also important for
the purpose of interpreting the "time of war" provisions of the
Uniform Code2' relating to the maximum punishment for certain
offenses, 22 the acceptance of guilty pleas in capital cases 23 and the
suspension of the statute of limitations, among other provisions.24 If,
for example, a soldier is charged in time of war with absence without
leave or missing movement, the offense can be prosecuted without
20. J. F. MAURICE, HOSTILITIES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR, FROM 1700
TO 1870, at 6 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1883).
21. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2003).
22. See United States v. Anderten, 4 C.M.A. 354 (1954); United States v.
Aldridge, 4 C.M.A. 107 (1954); United States v. Bancroft, 3 C.M.A. 3 (1953); United
States v. Gann, 3 C.M.A. 12 (1953).
23. See United States v. Sanders, 7 C.M.A. 21 (1956).
24. "A person charged with absence without leave or missing movement in time
of war, or with any offense punishable by death, may be tried and punished at any
time without limitation." 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (2003).
The statute of limitations for most military offenses in time of peace is two or
three years, but Congress apparently felt that the increased seriousness of wartime
AWOL and desertion justified overriding the safeguards of the statute of limitations
in order to help maintain discipline and a high esprit de corps among fighting units
under combat situations. See Recent Case, Military Law-Uniform Code of Military
Justice-Soldier Who Went AWOL on November 3, 1964, Was Absent in "Time of
War" and May Not Rely on Statute of Limitations, 82 HARV. L. REV. 483, 485 (1968).
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reference to statutes of limitation.21 In addition, if it is certified 26 to
the President that a Ltrial in time of war of any offense will be
detrimental to the prosecution of the war or inimical to national
security, the prescribed period of limitation is extended until six
months after the termination of hostilities (termination of which is
established by proclamation of the President or by a joint resolution
of Congress). 27 Further, if a state of war is determined to exist, the
severity of penalties for certain offenses under the Uniform Code can
be punishable by death: these penalties include desertion,' assaulting
an officer 29 and misbehavior of a sentinel." In addition, misconduct
by American POWs" and spying32 are punishable under the Uniform
Code only in time of war.
An additional area of concern is that the existence of a state of
war can extend court-martial jurisdiction to a significant number of
civilian employees not otherwise subject to such jurisdiction. Article
2(10) of the Uniform Code states that "[i]n time of war, persons
serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field" are subject
to its provisions.3 The exigencies of wartime have been deemed
sufficient to justify some restrictions on the rights of civilians who are
intimately connected with military operations.34 Although several
Supreme Court decisions have curtailed the application of court-
martial jurisdiction to civilians,35 these rulings applied to peacetime
25. See United States v. Ayers, 4 C.M.A. 220 (1954); United States v. Taylor, 4
C.M.A. 232 (1954).
26. This certification must be given by the Secretary of the appropriate branch of
the armed services. 10 U.S.C. §843(e) (2003).
27. Id. § 843(f).
28. Id. § 885(c).
29. Id. § 890.
30. Id. § 913.
31. Id. § 905.
32. Id. § 906.
33. Id. § 802(10).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).
35. The Supreme Court held that civilians are not subject to peacetime court-
martial jurisdiction in the following cases: Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960)
(civilian government employee charged with capital offense); Kinsella v. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234 (1960) (dependent charged with noncapital felony); McElroy v. United
States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian government employee charged
with noncapital felony). In Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court said that "[f]rom a
time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the extraordinary circumstances
present in an area of actual fighting have been considered sufficient to permit
punishment of some civilians in that area by military courts under military rules." 354
U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (emphasis added). The Court suggested that court-martial
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situations and presumably do not constrain military court-martial
jurisdiction over civilians serving with or accompanying the armed
forces in the field in time of war.
Military trials under court-martial jurisdiction do not provide the
full array of constitutional safeguards that are inherent in Article III
courts. Court-martial deprives a defendant of the Fifth Amendment
right to indictment by grand jury and the right under the Sixth
Amendment and Article III, section 2, to trial by jury of one's peers. 6
A court-martial is tried by a panel of officers empowered to convict
by a two-thirds vote, and the panel is generally not required to be
larger than five members, even for the most serious crimes."
Moreover, it has been observed that "[a] court-martial is not yet
an independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant
degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military
discipline is preserved."38 Many think that military judges are not
impartial and that there is little semblance of an Article III trial by
jury of one's peers:" "[T]he convening authority, a non-lawyer, has
extraordinary control over law enforcement, prosecution, and
adjudicative functions and may intentionally or unintentionally exert
unlawful command influence on the criminal proceedings." 0
That is, there is a command-dominated structure in court-martial
in which the convening authority:
jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military in the field should be limited to
the actual areas of hostilities, stating that "[t]he exigencies which have required
military rule on the battlefront are not present in areas where no conflict exists." Id.
at 35. The Court acknowledged Congress' broad war powers under Article I, § 8 of
the Constitution: "We believe that Article 2(10) sets forth the maximum historically
recognized extent of military jurisdiction over civilians under the concept of 'in the
field."' Id. at 34 n.61 (1957).
For analyses of these cases, see generally Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Court-Martial
Jurisdiction over Military-Civilian Hybrids, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1964); Peter D.
Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the United States Armed Forces
Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the Jurisdictional Gap?, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 273 (1967); Robert Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of
Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L.
REV. 461 (1961).
36. See Reid v. Cove
rt, 354 U.S. at 37.
37. 10 U.S.C. § 816.
38. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969).
39. See Maria Lugay Weidmann, The Military Jurisdictional Dilemma Revisited:
A Return to the Status-Only Requirement for Court-Martial Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 243, 261 (1989).
40. Id.
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[Hiand-picks the members of the panel from his own command.
Thus, there is potential for improper command influence by the
convening authority on the panel members because their officer
evaluation reports (similar to job performance evaluations) are
prepared by the same person who decides that the accused should
be court-martialed.4'
And:
Military judges, although they certainly may be honest, are
nonetheless military officers who must answer to those above
them.... [U]nlike article III judges, military judges still do not
serve under the protection of life tenure and serve for limited
periods of time. Thus, military judges do not have the opportunity
to gain experience and develop judicial temperament.42
In Reid v. Covert, Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed
that:
Courts-martial are typically ad hoc bodies appointed by a military
officer from among his subordinates. They have always been
subject to varying degrees of "command influence." In essence,
these tribunals are simply executive tribunals whose personnel are
in the executive chain of command. Frequently, the members of
the court-martial must look to the appointing officer for
promotions, advantageous assignments and efficiency ratings-in
43
short, for their future progress in the service.
A recent example of the perception that there can be unfair
command influence in court-martial proceedings involved a fighter
pilot who was charged with involuntary manslaughter and other
crimes for mistakenly bombing Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan,
killing four. The pilot, Major Harry Schmidt, refused an offer by the
Air Force to face an administrative hearing with possible
punishments including merely a reprimand or forfeiture of one
month's pay because he believed he could not get a fair hearing."
Citing an Air Force memorandum that referred to his "lack of
judgment" and his "violation of flying regulations," he claimed that
the officer who would have overseen the hearing had already decided
Major Schmidt was guilty and had refused to recuse himself.45
41. Id. at 261-62.
42. Id. at 261.
43. 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1956).
44. Associated Press, Pilot Declines Air Force Offer of Hearing in Bombing
Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at A20.
45. See id.
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If a war exists, that fact is relevant in determining whether
certain veterans' benefits accrue. 6 The determination of whether a
state of war exists is also relevant in determining whether certain
veterans preference points can be given in connection with hiring and
promotion of civil servants. 7
Another area of concern in military law is that the Table of
Maximum Punishments prescribed in the Uniform Code can be
suspended in time of war. Upon "a declaration of war" the law
provides for the automatic suspension of the limitations on maximum
punishment set forth in the Table of Maximum Punishments for
various offenses under the Uniform Code.' Alternatively, the
President can, by Executive Order, suspend the limitation on
maximum punishment imposable for certain offenses committed in
time of war,, as he did during the Korean conflict. 9 Such suspension
of maximum punishments makes it possible to convert certain
offenses to capital status because committed in time of war. A factual
determination that there is a state of war for certain purposes, such as
the suspension of the statute of limitations under the Uniform Code,
apparently relies on less formal constraints than does a determination
that a time of war exists for purposes of suspension of the Table of
Maximum Punishments." Presidents Kennedy and Johnson declined
to exercise their power to suspend the Table of Maximum
Punishments during the Vietnam conflict, apparently because they
felt that the conditions in Vietnam were not serious enough to
warrant suspension of the maximum punishments."
Another area of concern pertains to application of the law of
46. See, e.g., Alire's Case, 1 Ct. Cl. 233 (1865).
47. See, e.g., Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 348
(1969).
48. Manual for Courts-Martial [hereinafter MCM], 1951, para. 127c reads:
"Immediately upon a declaration of war.., the prescribed limitations on punishment
for violations of Articles 82, 85, 86, 87, 90, 113 and 115 automatically will be
suspended.., until formal termination of such war."
49. By Exec. Order No. 10247, May 29, 1951, the President suspended the Table
of Maximum Punishments, MCM, 1951, para. 127c, within the area controlled by the
Commander-in-Chief, Far East, for violations of the Uniform Code, arts. 82, 85,
86(3), 87, 90, 91(1), and (2), 113 and 115. Under this Order, the suspension of the
limitations on punishment applied only to certain time of war offenses committed by
personnel under the command of, or within any area controlled by, the Commander-
in-Chief, Far East Forces. See David B. Stevens, Time of War and Vietnam, 8 A.F. L.
REV. 23, 31 (1996).
50. See Stevens, supra note 49, at 28.
51. See Recent Case, supra note 24, at 489.
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seditious speech or conspiracy to commit sedition, which can be used
to prosecute extremists for a variety of terrorist plots. 2 The use of the
seditious conspiracy statute historically has depended on the political
state of affairs. In Schenck v. United States, Justice Holmes said, in
construing the predecessor statute of today's sedition law, that
"[w]hen a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.
53
Another reason for knowing whether a state of war exists is that
jus in bello rules apply in cases where an actual state of war exists.
However, some think that the rules of war apply to hostilities short of
formal war, whether labeled reprisals, armed intervention, organized
resistance, or other intermediate situations. The United States has
deployed troops abroad to engage in various types of military
operations other than war for the purpose of protecting Americans,
or to assist in the maintenance of civil order. In recent years such
operations have included those in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti
and the former Yugoslavia. In such operations, the question arises
whether the United States is required to classify captured personnel
as prisoners of war, detainees or refugees.55 Commanders face other
problems such as whether detainees are required to be quartered in
conditions as favorable as their own soldiers, whether captive
personnel are to be provided monthly medical inspections, whether
they are to be paid "fair" financial compensation for labor, and
whether they are permitted to receive correspondence under the
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention.6 Commanders faced
these issues in Operation Just Cause in 1989, which was a "non-war"
military intervention by the United States in Panama. U.S. forces
ended up detaining over 4,100 people during the operation, and
52. The seditious conspiracy statute is at 18 U.S.C. §2384 (2000).
53. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
54. See, e.g., 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 225 (Sir Hersh
Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
55. See, e.g., Memorandum from Headquarters XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort
Bragg, AEZA-JA, to Department of the Army, subject: Operation Urgent Fury
(After Action Report and Lessons Learned) (Dec. 15, 1983) (pertaining to Grenada
intervention in 1983 and explaining that judge advocates in Operation Urgent Fury
were uncertain on how to classify captured personnel because they were not
informed of the legal basis for the operation in a timely manner) (on file with
author).
56. Bulman, supra note 55, at 168.
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officials decided to accord them prisoner of war status under the
Geneva Conventions even though the hostilities were characterized
as something other than formal war.
In 1992, U.N. forces embarked on a humanitarian operation in
Somalia called Operation Restore Hope. This intervention started as
a simple emergency-relief mission but escalated into an aggressive
peace enforcement mission in which large numbers of Somalians who
attacked or threatened U.N. forces were detained and disarmed, and
then released without a determination being made as to whether or
not there was a war that would trigger international legal obligations
and protections.58
Finally, in time of war the President has, on occasion, sought to
suspend habeas corpus or to order certain individuals to be tried by
military commissions. During the Civil War, President Lincoln
suspended the habeas writ.59 The President claimed that he had "the
right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, at his discretion,
[and] to delegate that discretionary power to a military officer, and to
leave it to him to determine whether he will or will not obey judicial
process that may be served upon him."'  Lincoln asserted this
purported right with no public notice to the courts or to the public, by
proclamation or otherwise." Lincoln's action was declared
unconstitutional by Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a circuit judge, who
stated that he "regarded the question as too plain and too well settled
57. Id.
58. Id. at 169.
59. Many think that the language of the Constitution makes clear that only
Congress, not the President, may suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and even then
that this power is restricted to cases of actual rebellion or invasion. See Ex parte
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), in which Chief Justice
Taney, sitting as a circuit judge, said: "I had supposed it to be one of those points in
constitutional law upon which there was no difference of opinion,.., that the
privilege of the writ could not be suspended, except by an act of Congress." See also
Joseph Storey, Commentaries on the Constitution, 3: §§ 1333-36 (1883), reprinted in 1
PHILIP B. KURLAND, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 378 (1987) ("It would seem, as
the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of
rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency has arisen, must
exclusively belong to that body.")
Chief Justice Rehnquist has said that the privilege of habeas corpus "has been
rightly regarded as a safeguard against executive tyranny, and an essential safeguard
to individual liberty." Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the 100th
Anniversary Celebration of the Norfolk and Portsmouth Bar Association (May 3,
2000) at <www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-03-00.html>.
60. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148.
61. See id.
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to be open to dispute," and that the President "has exercised a power
which he does not possess under the constitution .... ,62
The power of the President to establish military commissions,
which are a recognized method of trying individuals for violations of
the law of war, is well established.63 On November 13, 2001, President
Bush signed Military Order 222, authorizing the trial of non-U.S.
citizens for war crimes by military commission6' This Military Order
grants to military commissions "exclusive jurisdiction" over the
covered offenses such that individuals subject to the Order "shall not
62. Id.
63. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 10 (1946), in which the Supreme Court
construed President Roosevelt's proclamation of July 2, 1942 "that enemy
belligerents who, during time of war, enter the United States, or any territory or
possession thereof, and who violate the law of war, should be subjeci to the law of
war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals." The Court cited an earlier case, Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942), in which it considered at length the nature and
authority to create military commissions for the trial of enemy combatants for
offenses against the law of war. The Court noted that source of the power to create
military commissions is in Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution, giving Congress the
power to "define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations ...." In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7. The Congress, in the exercise of its power, enacted the
Articles of War (formerly 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593), which came into existence as part
of the 1916 revisions to the Articles of War, thereby recognizing the military
commission "as it had previously existed in United States Army practice, as an
appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the law of war."
See id. The Court noted that Article 15 of the Articles of War, which in nearly
identical language became Article 21 of the Uniform Code, clearly sanctions the trial
of enemy combatants for violations of the law of war by military commissions. See id.
Clearly, the President has the power to trigger the jurisdiction of military
commissions in virtue of the fact that Congress has already recognized the
constitutional authority of the President to convene commissions in Article of War 15
(now Article 21) and, in addition, has provided, in Article 36 of the Uniform Code
that the President may prescribe rules for the trials of cases arising "in courts-martial,
military commissions and other military tribunals." 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2003).
Moreover, many think that the power of the President to convene military
commissions is inherent to his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. See
Timothy C. MacDonald, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief
Discussion of the Constitutional and Jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two
Courts, THE ARMY LAWYER, Mar. 2002, at 19, 20. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
held that absent congressional action to the contrary, the President has the authority
as Commander-in-Chief to create military commissions. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 72 (1952). Finally, customary international law recognizes the authority of
military commanders to try war criminals by military commission. See Wigfall Green,
The Military Commission, 42 AM J. INT'L L. 832, 832 (1948). Military commissions
have been convened by the United States to try war criminals in the American
Revolutionary War, the Mexican American War, the Civil War, and World War II.
See MacDonald, supra at 21.
64. Military Order 222, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding" in
"any court of the United States," "any foreign nation," or "any
international tribunal."65 The power to establish military commissions
depends on whether a state of war exists.
IH. Formalities in Establishing the Existence of War
A. History
The justification for engaging in war and the formalities
associated with declaring war have been chronicled throughout
history. In China during the Ch'unch'iu Period (722-481 B.C.), war
was permissible only between equal states, and not between a feudal
state and its dependencies, nor between the Chinese family of states
and barbarians. 66 In the ancient Greek states it was the practice to
articulate a justification for starting a war. Coleman Phillipson
summarizes this practice as follows: "Even in the heroic epoch in
Greece, no war was undertaken without the belligerents alleging a
definite cause considered by them as a valid and sufficient
justification therefore, and without their previously demanding
reparation for injuries done or claims unsatisfied."67
In the ancient Roman world there was an emphasis on formal
legality. A just war needed to be commenced pursuant to positive
law approved by the college of fetiales, with the focus not so much on
the intrinsic justice of the war as with the correct observation of
formalities.6 The war also needed to be pium, in accordance with
religious prescriptions and the express or implied commands of the
65. See id. § 7(b)(2). This Military Order appears to do away with the double
jeopardy protection of the Fifth Amendment. That is, the Military Order omits any
reference to this constitutional guarantee, leaving open the possibility that an
individual may be charged and tried in the civilian federal court, acquitted, and then
detained and brought to trial before a military commission for the same offense-or
vice versa. Indeed, the Order seems designed to permit the executive branch to try
its hand first in the federal courts, and if it seems that the prosecution may be
unsuccessful, bring precisely the same case before a military commission where it will
be permitted to use evidence that would be inadmissible in a federal court case
because, for example, it might be hearsay, thereby providing a better chance of
conviction. Clearly the constraints on liberties imposed by this Order, applicable in
time of war, are formidable.
66. See Shih-Tsai Chen, The Equality of States in Ancient China, 35 AM J. INT'L L.
641 (1941).
67. COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT
GREECE AND ROME 179 (1911).
68. Id. at 180.
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gods.69 Cicero and other historians of the Roman world held that no
war could be started until there was an official demand for whatever
was in contention, and there had been a warning given and a formal
declaration of war.70 A war was commenced by sending a herald to
the frontier to give notice according to established custom.
71
From the Scholastics period to the 14th century it was generally
believed that a war needed to be commenced under the authority of
the emperor or other sovereign.72 In addition, the Pope was entitled
to declare war against infidels.73 According to Martino da Lodi in a
treatise dated 1455, war was lawful, after giving due warning, if a
sovereign has not been able to enforce state rights in any other way.74
In order for a war to be just, a central theme of writers of the 14th
and 15th centuries was that the war needed to be declared by one
who has the power to declare it (justitia potestatis).75
In the 17th and 18th centuries the formalities of commencing a
war required notice to be given in a printed proclamation. As late as
1854, "[tlhe Sergeant-at-Arms, accompanied by some of the officials
of the City, read from the steps of the Royal Exchange Her Majesty's
declaration of war against Russia."76  Whether such notification
reached the enemy was not of much consequence. The United States
began the War of 1812 without allowing time for notice to reach
England. Of course, today, with improved global communication, a
declaration of war made in one country would be immediately known
in the enemy country.
Since the early 19th century, the practices of states developed the
notion that:
[W]ar is not a legal concept linked with objective phenomena such
as large-scale hostilities between the armed forces of organized
state entities but a legal status the existence of which depends on
the intention of one or more of the states concerned. Thus
hostilities resulting in considerable loss of life and destruction of
property may not result in a state of war, the term commonly
applied to this legal status, if the parties contending do not regard a
69. See id.
70. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 4.
71. See Eagleton, supra note 13, at 23.
72. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 6-7.
73. See id. at 7.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 9.
76. MAURICE, supra note 20, at 9.
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'state of war' as existing.77
B. Policy Reasons for Avoiding a Formal Declaration of War
Today it is a settled norm of international law that a formal
declaration of war is not a necessary condition for there to exist a
state of war." Of the 118 recognized wars that occurred between 1700
and 1872, only ten involved a formal declaration of war. 9
What is less clear, however, is the circumstances short of a formal
declaration of war that are sufficient to establish a state of war.
Congress can authorize a war without making a formal declaration of
war: "[N]either in the language of the Constitution, the intent of the
framers, the available historical and judicial precedents nor the
purposes behind the clause [Article 1, § 8]" is there a requirement for
a formal declaration of war,8° particularly where a war is engaged in
for a limited purpose and scope.
There. are numerous policy reasons why a formal declaration of
war is undesirable, including:
[I]ncreased danger of misunderstanding of limited objectives,
diplomatic embarrassment in recognition of non-recognized
guerrilla opponents, inhibition of settlement possibilities, the
danger of widening the war, and unnecessarily increasing a
President's domestic authority. Although each of these arguments
has some merit, probably the most compelling reason for not using
the formal declaration of war is that there is no reason to do so. As
former Secretary of Defense McNamara has pointed out "[T]here
has not been a formal declaration of war-anywhere in the world-
since World War II."81
That appears to remain as true today as it was when Secretary of
Defense McNamara spoke those words.
Congress has passed resolutions granting the President wide-
ranging discretion to engage in hostilities within prescribed places and
for stated purposes, such as the Tonkin Resolution, the Gulf War
77. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 26-27.
78. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 54, at 93; 7 JOHN B. MOORE, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1107 (1906).
79. See A. Kenneth Pye, The Legal Status of the Korean Hostilities, 45 GEO. L.J.
45, 48 (1956).
80. Note, Congress, The President, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1802 (1968).
81. John N. Moore, The National Executive and the Use of the Armed Forces
Abroad, 21 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 28, 33 (1969).
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Resolution, and the resolution following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Short of such resolutions, Congress has made it
clear when it has authorized the use of force by enacting legislation to
increase the size of the armed forces or to appropriate additional
funds to sustain a use of force."
C. The Sufficiency of a Declaration of War: Problems of
Retroactivity, Ambiguity and Unilateral Declarations
There are problems in determining what constitutes a declaration
of war in the first place, what form it should take, by whom it should
be issued, when a formal declaration has been issued and whether a
formal declaration of war in fact results in a state of war. Moreover,
in some instances it is not clear what the function of a declaration of
war is when the declaration is issued after hostilities have taken place
and, hence, after the beginning of the war.
In some cases Congress has had no option but to declare war, the
existence of which had already been recognized. For example, in
1846, President Polk authorized General Zachary Taylor to occupy
disputed land claimed by Mexico between the Nueces and Rio
Grande Rivers. The President instructed General Taylor to treat any
crossing of the Rio Grande as an invasion authorizing him to attack
first in defense and even enter Mexican territory in pursuit of the
invaders. 83 When, as expected, Mexican forces struck, and the battles
between the parties had begun, Polk presented the Congress with a
fait accompli, and Congress responded by authorizing further
hostilities.' The President sought to justify his recourse to arms
without first securing such approval from the Congress by the claim
that he was defending the United States against attack. Polk's actions
set a precedent for viewing "war" as the invasion of disputed territory
claimed under a treaty of annexation. Some years later, in
commenting on this conflict, Justice Grier noted in the Prize Cases,
that: "[tihe battles of Palo Alto and Rasaca de la Palma had been
fought before the passage of the Act of Congress of May 13, 1846
[which recognized] a state of war existing by the Act of the Republic
82. W. Taylor Reveley III, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative
or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1290 n.155 (1969).
83. See CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE
UNITED STATES 70-71 (1921).
84. See John C. Cruden, The War-Making Process, 69 MIL. L. REV. 35, 46 n.40.
(1975).
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of Mexico."85
Thus, when a declaration of war is issued after hostilities have
already broken out, the declaration does not mark the
commencement of a state of war, but serves as notice of when the war
actually commenced. Such a declaration effectively admits that war
was already in existence before the declaration was issued, in which
case the declaration serves as a retroactive declaration of war.' In
four out of the five instances that Congress has formally declared war,
the declaration has recognized the prior existence of that war.
Another problem concerning formal declarations of war is
ambiguity, so that the sufficiency of a declaration of war may be
doubted. An example of ambiguity that can be associated with a
formal declaration of war involved the case of The Teutonia.87 A
vessel by that name arrived off Falmouth, England on July 10, 1870,
and the next day received orders to proceed to Dunkirk, where it
arrived on July 16. The master of the ship had heard rumors of war
between France and Germany, so he did not enter the French port.
In fact that day the French minister had made a declaration to the
French Chamber of Deputies that appeared to be a declaration of
war. On July 18, the master of the ship was informed by the German
consul at Deal that war had broken out. On July 19, he brought his
vessel into Dover, the nearest neutral port. An English firm sued for
failure to deliver its goods to Dunkirk, and the defendant pleaded
that a state of war made the contract impossible to perform. The
lower court held for the defendant, finding that war existed on July 16
even though the French did not issue a formal declaration until July
19. The Lords reversed, holding as follows:
There does not appear to their Lordships to be any satisfactory
evidence that a state of war existed between France and Prussia
prior to the 19th of July.
Their Lordships do not think that either the declaration made by
the French Minister to the French Chambers on the 16th of July, or
the telegram sent by Count Bismarck to the Prussian Ambassador
in London, in which he states that that declaration appears to be
equal to a declaration of War, amounts to an actual declaration of
War. And though it is true.., that a War may exist de facto
without a declaration of War, yet it appears to their Lordships that
85. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
86. See Eagleton, supra note 13, at 32-33.
87. The Teutonia, 4 L.R.-P.C. 171 (1872).
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this can only be effected by an actual commencement of hostilities,
88
which, in this case, is not alleged.
Thus, the court noted that the declaration itself did not appear
sufficiently clear as to constitute a declaration of war, and there was
no evidence of a de facto state of war inasmuch as hostilities had not
yet broken out.
A further issue concerning ambiguity occurs if there is a
unilateral declaration of war. A declaration of war by one country
against another need not automatically place the countries at war.
For example, when Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania declared war on
the United States on December 13, 1941, President Roosevelt simply
ignored the declarations. Only later, as a gesture of friendship to the
Soviet Union, did he ask Congress to recognize that the United States
was at war with these countries.89
However, it is possible for Legal War to exist by the action and
intentions of one state alone.9° At the Second Hague Conference in
1907 a Chinese representative raised the question "whether a
declaration of war can be considered by the State toward which it is
directed as a unilateral act and whether the latter can regard it as null
and void." 91 The answer is that generally, "a declaration of war by
one country only, is not a mere challenge to be accepted or refused at
pleasure by the other."92 In other words, "The state acted against may
be forced into a state of war against its will." 93  But a unilateral
declaration of war by a relatively weak state against a more powerful
state may well be regarded as, in effect, null and void. Or, "[i]t may
be open to a powerful state to disregard a declaration of war against it
by a weaker state which fails to follow up the declaration with actual
hostilities."'94 Moreover, odd results are possible if a state of war can
88. Id. at 178-179.
89. 88 CONG. REC. 4787 (1942).
90. See Wright, supra note 2, at 363 n.6.
91. 3 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1907 HAGUE CONFERENCE 169 (Translation in
Official Texts).
92. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) (quoting Lord Stowell in
The Eliza Ann, 1 Dodson 244, 247 (Adm. 1813)). War, as defined by Corpus Juris,
may exist prior to any contest of the armed forces. "The Courts are bound by a
declaration or determination by the proper department of government that a war
exists," while until there has been such a declaration or determination, the Courts
cannot take judicial notice of the existence of a war by their government. 93 C.J.S.
War § 1 (2001).
93. Wright, supra note 2, at 363 n.6.
94. Manley 0. Hudson, The Duration of the War Between the United States and
[Vol. 27:221
Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When Does It End?
arise from the actions and intentions of one state alone. For example,
one state could commit an act of aggression by launching a fleet to
embark on an attack, unbeknownst to the victim state, thus
establishing a state of war. The victim state would be unaware of the
"state of war," and indeed the war would technically exist before the
attack becomes imminent.95
"Congress has never in its history declared war except as a
consequence of the President's acts or recommendations. It has
never refused a request from the President that war be declared."96 In
U.S. history there have been only five wars formalized by
straightforward congressional declarations. In four of the five
instances that Congress formally declared wars, the declarations of
war recognized the prior existence of war. The fifth, involving the
War of 1812, simply stated, "war be and the same is hereby declared
to exist. '9 Five formal U.S. declarations of war are reprinted below,
along with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, whose formality or lack
thereof debatable.
War of 1812:
Be it enacted by... Congress assembled, That war be and the same
is hereby declared to exist... and that the President... is hereby
authorized to use the whole land and naval force... to carry the
98
same into effect ....
Mexican War of 1846:
Be it enacted by... Congress assembled, That for the purpose of
enabling the ... United States to prosecute said war to a speedy...
termination, the President... is... authorized to emAOy the
militia, naval, and military forces of the United States 
....
Spanish-American War of 1898:
Be it enacted by... Congress assembled, First, That war be, and the
same is hereby, declared to exist, and that war has existed since the
twenty-first day of April... between the United States of America
Germany, 39 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1024 (1926).
95. See, e.g., William Ronan, English and American Courts and the Definition of
War, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 654 (1937) (citing the Takahashi in the Russo-Japanese
War Cases).
96. United States v. Anderson, 17 C.M.A. 588, 591 (1968).
97. Declaration of War Between the United States and Great Britain, 2 Stat. 755
(1812).
98. Id.
99. Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9 (providing for the prosecution of the
existing war between the United States and Mexico).
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and the Kingdom of Spain... [and] the President is...
[authorizedl... to employ the entire naval and military
forces ....
World War I against Germany:
Resolved by ... Congress assembled, That the state of war between
the United States and the Imperial German Government which has
thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally
declared... [and] the President is... authorized.., to employ the
entire naval and military forces..
World War II against Japan:
Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed
unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of
the United States of America [referring to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941] ... Resolved... That the state
of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of
Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby
formally declared... [and] the President is... authorized ... to
employ the entire naval and military forces .... 102
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress
approved and supports the determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent
further aggression.... [T]he United States is, therefore, prepared,
as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including
the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.'0 3
100. Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (declaring war between the United
States and Spain).
101. Joint Resolution of Apr. 11, 1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (declaring war between
Germany and the United States and provision to prosecute the same).
102. Joint Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (declaring war between
Japan and the United States and provision to prosecute the same) The declarations
of war against Germany and Italy contained substantially similar language to the
declaration of war against Japan. See Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55
Stat. 796 (declaring war between Germany and the United States and provision to
prosecution the same); Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 565, 55 Stat. 797
(declaring war between Italy and the United States and provision to prosecute the
same).
103. Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
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There is a split of opinion as to whether the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution constituted a formal declaration of war or simply a
legislative acknowledgement "that the Gulf of Tonkin attack
precipitated a state of armed conflict between the United States and
Vietnam."'
D. Military and Diplomatic Operations Other Than War
The United States has frequently deployed troops abroad to
engage in various types of military operations other than war for the
purpose of protecting Americans or to assist in the maintenance of
civil order. Some situations clearly do not constitute a state of war.
Armed forces might be employed with a view to reprisals,
humanitarian interventions and other kinds of action, without any
intention of creating a state of war. Reprisal, for instance, is a classic
mode of "self-help, part execution and part sanction. Its value [lies]
in the possibility of gaining redress without creating a formal state of
w ar."
10 5
Presidential authorization for U.S. forces to be utilized for
evacuation and rescue operations of Americans abroad and other
limited missions to rescue endangered American citizens do not
constitute a "time of war.""' The rationale for this is that troops are
not being introduced into hostilities as such in rescue operations, but
are engaged in a limited defensive mission."°7
The power of the President to deploy troops for peacemaking
missions without Congressional authorization appears to be firmly
within his authority as Commander-in-Chief. In 1912 President Taft
deployed the armed forces in Nicaragua to help protect American
lives. The State Department at the time drew a distinction between
"intervention," which pertained to the interference with another
state's political concerns, and "interposition," which involved the
104. See discussion, Part IV.B., infra.
105. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 220.
106. See Cruden, supra note 84, at 86-87.
107. During the Senate debate on the War Powers Resolution, Senator Javits
stated:
I think the normal practice which has grown up on this [evacuation and
rescue operations is that it does not involve such a utilization of the forces
of the United States as to represent a use of forces appreciably, in hostilities
so as to constitute an exercise of the war power or as to constitute a
commitment of the Nation to war.
119 CONG. REC. 18995 (1973).
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protection of the persons or interests of the interposing country.'9
An "interposition" was not the sort of use of force as would require
authorization from Congress. °9
President Taft also once said that the power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to order the army and navy anywhere:
[G]ives the President an opportunity to do things which involve
consequences that it would be quite beyond his power under the
Constitution directly to effect.... [T]he President can take action
such as to involve the country in war and to leave Congress no
option but to declare it or to recognize its existence.... Indeed...
in the prize cases... [the Supreme Court held] it was only in the
case of a war of aggression that the power of Congress must be
affirmatively asserted to establish its legal existence."
In addition to interventions to protect American property or
lives abroad, it is considered part of the inherent power of the
President as Commander-in-Chief to render military assistance in
periods of civil disorder abroad, especially when the local authorities
are unable to provide needed protection, or to intervene where
fighting has already begun between non-democratic states or between
factions within non-democratic states. These limited military
interventions, while forceful and involving the deployment of troops
in combat, are generally not regarded as a state of war.1' Such
actions are not aimed at attacking the sovereignty of any nation, but
at scattered rebels or thugs. In recent years such operations have
included interventions in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti and the
former Yugoslavia. With the invasion of Panama, for example, the
President took action without congressional authorization on the
grounds that the government of Manuel Noriega was illegitimate, and
that this illegitimacy gave rise to a unilateral right to invade the
country.112 Another example was the unanimous resolution of the
U.N. General Assembly in 1991, demanding that its member states
take "action to bring about the diplomatic isolation of those who hold
108. Note, supra note 80, at 1788.
109. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES 24-34, 40, 44, 48 (3d rev. ed. 1934) (Memorandum
of the Solicitor).
110. United States v. Anderson, 17 C.M.A. 588, 591 (1968) (citing The Presidency:
Its Duties, Its Powers, Its Opportunities, and Its Limitations, University of Virginia,
Barbour-Page Foundation Lectures, Jan. 1915).
111. See generally Bulman, supra note 55, at 167 n.71.
112. See ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE 193 (1993).
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power illegally in Haiti" and "suspend their economic, financial, and
commercial ties" with the country until democratic rule is restored."'3
Recently, no eyebrows were raised, apparently, when the
Pentagon worked up a plan for the President to commit up to 2,000
troops to oversee a cease-fire in war-battered Liberia to restore
stability-a deployment that was thought to take only a few months."'
Similarly, without Congressional authorization, President Bush
committed himself to sending 1,700 American troops to help root out
Muslim militants in southern Philippines.1"'
Some, however, think that the decision to deploy troops abroad,
even ostensibly for peaceful purposes, belongs to Congress, and
particularly in cases where the likelihood of conflict is apparent.1
' 6
Indeed, these types of engagements, where troops have been
deployed without congressional authorization, have led to several of
the most significant wars of the past century. Examples include the
Korean War (1950-1953), which President Truman originally
characterized as "police action,' ' 7 and the conflict in former
Yugoslavia (1991-1995).
Diplomatic and other executive powers of the President, while
falling short of declaring or waging war, can have a substantial
likelihood of leading to war. One commentator has referred to the
"ability of the President simply by his day-to-day conduct of our
foreign relations to create situations from which escape except by the
route of war is difficult or impossible."" 8
113. Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti,
OEA/Ser.FV.1/MRE/RES.1/91, corr. 1, paras. 5, 6 (1991).
114. See Eric Schmitt & Richard W. Stevenson, U.S. Is Considering Troops in
Liberia To Monitor Truce, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2003, at Al.
115. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Affirms U.S. Is Ready to Send Troops to the
Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2003, at A15.
116. See Note, supra note 80, at 1787.
117. See ROBERT LECKIE, THE WARS OF AMERICA 858 (1968). General Douglas
MacArthur expressed his view as to the manner in which the President had deployed
troops to the Korean conflict:
I could not help being amazed at the manner in which this great decision was
being made. With no submission to Congress, whose duty it is to declare
war, and without even consulting the field commander involved, the
members of the executive branch of the government agreed to enter the
Korean war. All the risks inherent to this decision-including the possibility
of Chinese and Russian involvement-applied then just as much as they
applied later.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES 376 (1965).
118. CORWIN, supra note 13, at 274.
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For example, President Wilson decided to rely on his own legal
authority in ordering American merchant vessels to be equipped with
guns, over the objections of Congress, and said later that he knew his
action was "practically certain" to draw the United States into war."'
President Franklin Roosevelt took various actions, without
congressional authorization, that were said to have pushed the nation
toward World War II. On September 3, 1940, he made the famous
"Fifty Destroyer Deal," a controversial exchange of fifty aging
destroyers for a lease of British bases in the Western Atlantic. In
April 1941, he sent troops to occupy Greenland, a Danish possession
since 1814, under an agreement with the Danish Minister in
Washington-Denmark itself having been invaded by Germany on
April 9, 1940. Two months later he took the strategic country of
Iceland under American protection at that country's request; he
authorized the occupation of Dutch Guinea, and issued his famous
"shoot-on-sight" order to the Navy:
[W]hen you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until
he has struck before you crush him. The Nazi submarines and
raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic .... They are a challenge
to our sovereignty.
1 2 0
And President Lyndon Johnson authorized secret payments to
Filipino, Thai and Korean troops in Vietnam in an effort to give the
appearance that there was free-world support for American
involvement.121
A foreign country might regard the deployment of U.S. forces for
peace-keeping or other similar "non-war" missions as a threat
requiring retaliation, but that does not imply that the President has
exceeded his powers as Commander-in-Chief. Nor does action by the
President in shaping and directing American foreign policy in a
particular direction, though it may provoke a country into an attack,
119. 55 CONG. REC. 103 (1917); see also ARTHUR S. LINK, WILSON THE
DIPLOMATIST 84-85 (1963). The Senate defeated, through a filibuster, a bill that
would have given authorization for President Wilson to arm U.S. merchant ships in
1917. Following that defeat, the President proceeded under "the plain implication of
my constitutional duties and powers" to order the arming of such vessels with
instructions to fire on sight at submarines. See 54 CONG. REc. 4273 (1917). The
action was justified as necessary to defend the neutral U.S. merchant vessels against
the dangers inherent in submarine warfare.
120. President's Address on Freedom of the Seas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1941, at
A4. "The fact that the September 11 ["shoot-on-sight"] speech put the nation into
war is widely recognized." MERLO PUSEY, THE WAY WE GO TO WAR 72 (1969).
121. Cruden, supra note 84, at 59.
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thereby imply that the President has unconstitutionally "initiated"
122
war.
While it is the general view that the actual commitment of troops
to combat, not their deployment in non-combat situations, is subject
to congressional control,'23 there are problems with this view. The
degree and extent of troop deployments can make a big difference in
the likelihood that hostilities might erupt, even if "peacefully"
deployed abroad. It is one thing to send troops to maintain order in
weak countries where a severe contest at arms with another nation is
not likely to result, and quite another thing to send troops to "hot
spots" in the world, whereby the President might in effect guarantee
that there will be an attack on the U.S. troops stationed there. And if
there is an attack on troops stationed abroad, there will need to be a
decision as to whether the risk of war inherent in military retaliation
is worth the interests involved.
Over time, each instance of the use of presidential powers to
influence world affairs in a way that draws the nation into war has in
effect ratcheted up the public's tolerance of a kind of de facto power
of the President to declare war, despite the fact that Article I, section
8 of the Constitution states that Congress has the power "to declare
war." "[I1n each successive crisis the constitutional results of earlier
crises reappear cumulatively and in magnified form.', 24 The public
apparently allowed the Vietnam conflict to escalate, based almost
exclusively on presidential authority, coupled with the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution that bolstered the President's authority. But the public's
tolerance threshold came to a head when a wellspring of anti-war
sentiment swept the nation, and Congress felt impelled to rein in on
what was perceived as a usurpation of its Article I, section 8, power to
declare war. This culminated in the War Powers Resolution.
E. The War Powers Resolution-An Effort to Rein in the President
The War Powers Resolution (the Resolution),'25 was enacted in
1973 in the wake of public outrage about the Vietnam conflict and
122. See Note, supra note 80, at 1786. A recent example is President Bush's
characterization of North Korea, Iran and Iraq as an "axis of evil" in his State of the
Union message of January 29, 2002. See Press Release, White House, The President's
State of the Union Address (January 29, 2002) at
<www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html>.
123. See Note, supra note 80, at 1786.
124. CORWIN, supra note 13, at 262.
125. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
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what many regarded as runaway presidential war-making despite the
absence of a declaration of war.126 To some extent, the Resolution
provides a mechanism which can be relied upon as a source of
determining whether a time of war exists. The Resolution provides
that in the absence of a declaration of war, if armed forces are
introduced:
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to
supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed
Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours [to the Congress] a
report, in writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United
States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such
introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.127
126. There is a split of opinion as to whether the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
constituted a formal declaration of war or simply a legislative acknowledgement "that
the Gulf of Tonkin attack precipitated a state of armed conflict between the United
States and Vietnam." United States v. Anderson, 17 C.M.A. 588, 590 (1968). Chief
Judge Quinn regarded the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to be a declaration of war.
However, Judge Kilday did not find the Resolution to be a declaration of war, but
simply evidence that the war had already begun pursuant to the President's inherent
power to repel sudden attacks in response to the confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin.
To Judge Kilday, the Resolution represented only "a congressional appraisal of
world happenings," and that it was the events rather than the Resolution that
determined the existence of a state of war. Id. at 594. He said that war may exist
without congressional declaration, and that a state of war existed for "obvious
reasons." Id. at 593. Judge Ferguson said that it was clear that the United States was
in a state of war, and that reference to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was therefore
irrelevant.
Two Army review board opinions in 1965, after the Resolution, found that no
war had been declared in Vietnam. See United States v. Telfare, 36 C.M.R. 665
(1965), appeal denied, 16 C.M.A. 653 (1966); United States v. Greco, 36 C.M.R. 559
(1965).
127. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
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Clearly, the Resolution pertains only to instances of "the absence
of a declaration of war." '128 The Resolution does not imply that the
introduction of U.S. armed forces into any one of the three categories
of involvement stated constitutes a time of war. That determination
would be subject to an ad hoc determination, just as in any other
conflict that occurs without a formal declaration of war on the part of
Congress. In enumerating the three types of occasions that trigger
the 48-hour reporting requirement, the Resolution does not use the
word "war," but rather the terms "hostilities," "imminent
involvement in hostilities," "equipped for combat," or the substantial
enlargement of the number of armed forces already deployed in a
foreign nation. If U.S. armed forces are deployed in a manner that
falls into one of the three categories, the President is required to
submit a written report to the Congress within 48 hours of the
deployment.
The next step under the Resolution is for the Congress to take
appropriate action. Under section 5(b) of the Resolution129 the
President must terminate any use of U.S. armed forces within sixty
days after such report is submitted, unless Congress has declared war,
has "enacted a specific authorization" for the deployment, or has
extended the sixty day period. Of the three options available to it
under section 5(b), Congress has chosen to use the "specific
authorization" route in recent times.
Section 8(a)(1) of the Resolution provides that Congressional
appropriations shall not be construed to imply authority to introduce
U.S. forces into hostilities unless such provision specifically authorizes
the introduction of armed forces into hostilities and states that it is
intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of the War Powers Resolution. In other words, the
Resolution makes it clear that appropriations for troops do not imply
statutory authorization for their deployment, much less a formal
declaration of war, even if such appropriations in fact are intended for
troops already in the field or being readied for combat.
The War Powers Resolution was triggered in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. After the President deployed
forces to Afghanistan, he submitted the 48-hour report, following
which the Congress passed a joint resolution pursuant to section 5(b)
of the Resolution, entitled the Authorization for Use of Military
128. Id.
129. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
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Force.3 ° This joint resolution provided in part:
Sec. 2. Authorization for use of United States Armed Forces.
(a) In general. That the President is authorized to use all necessary
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by
such nations, organizations or persons.
(b) War Powers Resolution requirements. (1) Specific statutory
authorization. Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution."'
In other words, the Congress opted not to declare war, but
simply to provide "authorization" for the President's deployment of
force for the purpose of going after those responsible for the terrorist
attacks and in order to prevent future terrorist attacks against the
United States.
The War Powers Resolution appears to have brought to the
surface what was known to be the case sub silencio, that is, that
Congress can authorize war without declaring war. Nonetheless, in
the absence of a formal declaration of war, a mere "authorization" of
Congress can result in divergent opinions in cases that construe
whether a state of war exists, as illustrated above in my discussion of
the Tonkin Resolution.
The Congress is empowered under the War Powers Resolution
to enact authorization under section 5(b) in advance of military
action. As the standoff between Iraq and U.N. weapons inspectors
escalated in the fall of 2002 (or, at any rate, failed to garner
satisfactory results from the perspective of the United States and the
United Kingdom), and even though diplomatic efforts were still
under way, Congress passed a joint resolution called the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002.132 This joint resolution provided authorization for the President
to use armed forces as he determined to be necessary and appropriate
130. 50 U.S.C. § 1544.
131. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (emphasis added).
132. Act of Oct. 16, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498.
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in order to defend the national security of the United States against
the continuing threat posed by Iraq. The joint resolution stated that
this was intended to constitute "specific statutory authorization"
under section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution for the use of armed
forces.13 As such, the "authorization" did not constitute a declaration
of war.
The silence or inaction on the part of Congress in the wake of
Presidential action to engage in hostilities, does not, in and of itself,
imply approval 9 "The burden is not upon Congress to make its
views clear or be deemed to have acquiesced, but rather upon the
President to obtain legislative approval before he acts.' 35 Today,
with the War Powers Resolution, the onus is even more squarely
placed on the President to obtain legislative approval once hostilities
have been commenced, if the relevant threshold contemplated by the
Resolution has been met.
IV. The State of War Doctrine
A. Applies to Situations Where There Is No Declaration of War
It is not possible to uncover precisely the sequence of events that
may convert a mere conflict or reprisal or interdiction into a full-
fledged war.
Clearly, initiator and aggressor are not always identical, as a
participant might provoke its adversary into military action by
mobilization or other aggressive diplomatic or economic actions.
But the designation of the initiator of military aggression should
nevertheless provide some tentative clues as to the relative
belligerency of system members.'36
Under this view, there is an effort to distinguish an aggressor from its
opponent, perhaps in order to analyze whether the initiator of a war
justified the move based on plausible claims of self-defense or other
justification under international law. But as the examples below
make clear, even a justifiable attack that is provoked by an adversary,
in and of itself, does not mean the conflict is a Legal War.
Some have endeavored to articulate a litmus test by which a
133. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
134. Reveley, supra note 82, at 1290 n.155.
135. Id.
136. MELVIN SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, INTERNATIONAL WAR: AN ANTHOLOGY
33 (2d ed. 1989).
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conflict may be said to be a Legal War. For example, according to the
Correlates of War Project (COW), a conflict is not classified as a war
unless 1000 battle fatalities have occurred.37  In accordance with
COW protocol, wars are classified as "extra-systemic" (where at least
one party is not yet a recognized state), civil wars (occurring within
one state), or interstate in nature.138 This approach, classifying a
conflict as war if the numbers meet a certain threshold, has a practical
ring to it, but has little authoritative weight in international law.
The notion that the legal existence of war depends on the
intention of the parties concerned is known as the "state -of war"
doctrine. The state of war doctrine is a subjective test. What is
peculiar about the state of war doctrine is that an invasion, military
occupation, blockade, reprisal or other acts of aggression can occur in
the absence of a state of war if the governments concerned so
determine. Under this doctrine, a war in the formal sense exists: (1) if
one state issues a declaration of war against another state; or (2) if,
absent such a declaration, one state commits an act of aggression
against another state (e.g., a blockade, interdiction, invasion by
military troops or other act traditionally regarded as aggression), and
calls upon other states to observe the international obligations of
neutrality;'39 or (3) if, absent such a declaration, a state commits an act
137. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Use of Force and Constitutionalism, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 459 n.42 (1997).
138. See id.
139. Of course, when there is a use of force that falls short of actual war, the laws
of neutrality do not apply. The concept of neutrality, established in the 18th century,
is a vital feature of international law, and has been variously described by
international law publicists. To Christian Wolff (1679-1754) a neutral state could not
distinguish between the combatants, and would not be concerned with the question
of whether one side or the other was engaged in a just war. See BROWNLIE, supra
note 7, at 16. The laws of neutrality govern the relations between neutral and
belligerent states. An obligation to remain neutral may be treaty-based or predicated
on a general state policy of permanent neutrality. A formal declaration of neutrality
is not legally required, although in practice usually is made. Bilateral neutrality
agreements that relate to specific conflicts are, in effect, politically supportive of one
of the parties. The basic rights and obligations of neutrality are as follows. The
neutral state has the right of territorial integrity, that is, the belligerents may not
invade the neutral state. The neutral state in time of war may carry on commerce
with the belligerents, and not be subjected to blockade (unless, of course, the neutral
state is engaged in shipping contraband to a belligerent). The neutral state may not
intervene in the conflict to the advantage of one or the other belligerents, not even if
the intention is equal treatment for both parties. The neutral state may not provide
financial aid or supply war materials to the belligerents, nor accord them the right of
booty in sea warfare, nor allow war vessels to enter its ports for repairs, although they
may be allowed to enter to take on provisions. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 32-33.
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of aggression against another state and the latter state, in deploying
forces to repel the aggression, chooses to regard the circumstances as
establishing a state of war between the two states.
In 1927 a Report of the Secretary-General of the League of
Nations affirmed the state of war doctrine in this statement:
[F~rom the legal point of view, the existence of a state of war
between two States depends upon their intention and not upon the
nature of their acts. Accordingly, measures of coercion, however
drastic, which are not intended to create and which are not
regarded by the State to which they are applied as creating a state
of war, do not legally establish a relation of war between the states
concerned.14°
Quincy Wright confirms the view that "an act of war can always
be construed by either the attacker or the attacked as initiating war,
but if neither of them does so construe it, war does not exist.
1 41
Thus, the state of war doctrine holds that the existence of a state
of war depends not upon objective facts, such as the nature and scale
of the adts, but upon the subjective "state of mind" of the parties, and
their intentions. A blatant act of force or violation of territorial
integrity by one state against another, while objectively an act of
aggression under international law, becomes Legal War only if one
state or the other so regards it.
142
However, if one state commits acts of aggression on a large scale
against another state, while repeatedly asserting that it does not
intend to make war, it is possible for the victim state to regard the act
as instituting a state of war, and if it does, a state of war exists.
143
B. Construal of State of War by Commanders in the Field
It is possible that the actions of proclamations of a commander in
the field, or an admiral in the navy, can be equivalent to a declaration
See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Neutrality Laws 567-
570 (1997).
Under the state of war doctrine, states generally accept the legal characterization
that a war does not exist given by the parties to a conflict, and thereby refrain from
claiming that the laws of neutrality come into play. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at
39.
140. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 38.
141. Quincy Wright, Changes in the Conception of War, 18 AM. J. INT'LL. 756,759
(1924). By "acts of war" Wright was referring to an invasion of a state's territory or
an attack on the public forces of a state. See id.
142. See RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 19.
143. See Wright, supra note 2, at 365.
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of war or may establish a state of war.'" The independence of Greece
was in fact a result of the unauthorized action of naval commanders
who sunk Turkish vessels at Navarino, although the states involved
claimed that the hostilities did not amount to a state of war.'45 Often
enough, naval commanders or generals in the field are given the
authority to use their discretion to proceed to deploy force against an
enemy as they deem fit. Examples include the 1846 authorization of
President Polk for General Zachary Taylor to occupy land and
proceed against Mexican insurgents if they crossed the Rio Grande
and President Lincoln's proclamation of a blockade against states in
rebellion, giving broad authority to naval commanders to engage in
interdiction.
146
C. Construal of a State of War by Third States Not Party to the
Conflict
If two states engaged in hostilities disclaim that a state of war
exists, can a third state, not a party to the conflict, issue a declaration
that effectively establishes the existence of war? Though this rarely
happens, third states have in fact converted situations into Legal War
by recognizing them as such. 47 The American action in the blockade
of Venezuela in 1902 is a leading example.'48 Another example
occurred when European states issued proclamations of neutrality,
effectively declaring that the American Civil War was in fact a war
before it was deemed a Legal War in the United States.' 9 Another
example was when the President of the United States issued a
proclamation during the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, asserting that a state
of war existed between those two states."° In addition, courts of one
country have often passed judgment as to whether a state of war
existed between two other countries."' Still, it seems odd, or at least
counterintuitive, that a third state, by issuing a proclamation
acknowledging that a state of war exists between other states, could
have compelling force over the relations of the belligerents
144. See Eagleton, supra note 13, at 28.
145. See id.
146. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 684-86 (1862) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting).
147. See Wright, supra note 2, at 366.
148. See id. at 367.
149. See Eagleton, supra note 13, at 26.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 27.
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themselves, such that the hostile states might have to suspend their
treaties, comport with the laws of war and submit to all other
consequences that append to a state of war.
But third states may be motivated to proclaim that other
countries are in a state of war if hostilities are interfering with their
commerce on the high seas, so that they can formally be secured by
the international laws of neutrality. Moreover, third states may need
to decide whether a state of war exists in order to determine the
interpretation of the phrase "war" in domestic statutes, and to
determine the applicability of insurance contract limitations on
property destroyed by bombardment, the incidence of international
responsibility for such losses, or other legal questions concerning the
interests of their citizens, as well as the more general obligations with
respect to neutrality or anti-war treaties.
D. Deference to the Political Branches of Government in Construal
of a State of War by the Courts
Courts generally place the determination of the state of war
within the sole province of the political branches of government:
"The question, whether or not war, in its legal sense exists, is to be
determined alone by the political power of the government; and of
this determination the courts must take judicial knowledge .... 152
But there is a wide divergence among the courts in the criteria used to
determine whether the political branches of the government have
decided that a state of war exists. Courts have run the gamut from
the strictest interpretation, requiring a formal declaration of war by
Congress, to a pragmatic approach that takes into consideration the
nature of the hostilities and surrounding circumstances. And courts
have ruled that a given military situation may be a "time of war" for
some purposes but not for others. Some cases give the sense that
courts, in both court-martial and civil jurisdiction, have exhibited
divergent views on whether a state of war exists in order to effectuate
what a given court perceives to be a just outcome in the case at hand.
In the absence of an expressed declaration of war, courts may
look to expressions of the political will of the government in official
pronouncements that clarify, one way or another, that the
government regards a given conflict as a state of war. Courts have,
however, thwarted the political will of the executive and legislative
branches' disclaimer of any intention of making war, by finding, in
152. Sutton v. Tiller, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 593, 595 (1869).
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some cases, that the existence of war may be implied by warlike acts
that contradict official denials. An example of this pragmatic
approach was in Dole v. The Merchant's Marine Insurance Company,
in which the court said:
War is an existing fact and not a legislative decree. Congress alone
may have power to declare it beforehand, and thus cause or
commence it. But it may be initiated by other nations, or by
traitors; and then it exists, whether there is any declaration or not.
It may be prosecuted without any declaration, or Congress may, as
in the Mexican War, declare its previous existence. In either case it
is the fact which makes "enemies" and not any legislative act.
53
Courts will construe appropriations by Congress to support
military operations abroad as implied approval of the President's war
making, and serving as authorization to continue the expedition.'
Such appropriations generally come after the hostilities have already
begun, with the President presenting Congress with a fait accompli
that makes it difficult to do anything other than "support our troops."
Courts may also be influenced by the existence of active hostilities on
a large scale, the nature of resolutions of Congress referring to the
hostilities, authorizations for soldiers in combat to be provided with
additional veterans' benefits, and Executive Orders relating to the
conflict such as presidential proclamations prescribing the area of
combat as a combat zone for pay and decoration purposes"' or in
proclaiming a day of observance and prayer in connection with the
hostilities. 5" Other warlike acts, such as the proclamation of blockade
or other hostile acts, may convince courts that a state of war exists.
Courts have noted that "[bilockade itself is a belligerent right, and
can legally have place only in a state of war," 51 and that "the
proclamation of blockade is, itself, official and conclusive evidence to
the court that a state of war existed.', 8 The most compelling example
of a blockade in modern time occurred with the Cuban Missile Crisis
in October 1962, although in and of itself, the blockade was not
153. 51 Me. 465,470 (1862).
154. See Note, supra note 80, at 1801.
155. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,216, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1965); Exec. Order No.
11,231, 3 C.F.R. 325 (1965).
156. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3686, 3 C.F.R. 145 (1965) (proclaiming a day of
observance and prayer for the defense of South Vietnam).
157. United States v. The Tropic Wind, 28 F. Cas. 218, 221 (C.C.D.C. 1861) (No.
16,541a).
158. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635. 670 (1862).
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accompanied by further acts of hostilities, and was short lived so that
a state of war did not exist.'59
And as to the existence of other hostile acts, courts have
regarded the existence of authorized hostilities, or the mere
authorization of hostilities, as evidence that the political department
intends to regard the situation as a state of war, and in connection
with this, courts will gauge how long and on how great a scale
hostilities have existed before the situation will be recognized as a
state of war.16°
V. Case Studies of Conflicts Denied To Be War by Belligerents
In light of these features of the state of war doctrine, it is
instructive to examine the extent to which states have gone in denying
that a state of war exists, and the status accorded such conflicts by
courts that have had occasion to consider various types of legal issues
in connection with the conflicts. It is first well worth asking the
question: Is there an intermediate state between war and peace? The
answer is, simply, that it is a principle of international law that there is
no "intermediate" state between war and peace. Hugo Grotius
established the maxim, "Inter bellum et pacem nihil est medium"
(There is no intermediate state between war and peace).16' The
House of Lords, speaking through Lord MacNaghten in Janson v.
Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd., said in 1902: "I think the
learned counsel for the respondent was right in saying that the law
recognizes a state of peace and a state of war, but that it knows
nothing of an intermediate state which is neither one thing nor the
159. The United States imposed the naval quarantine on Cuba to compel the
removal of Soviet missiles that were perceived to pose a threat to American security,
based on anticipatory-self defense. See President John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
Proclamation 3504: Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, 57 AM.
J. INT'L L. 512 (1963). President Kennedy stated that the Soviets were assembling
delivery systems for intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba. Regarding this
development as "a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo,"
Kennedy ordered the naval blockade, which he termed a "quarantine," to prevent
the transport of missiles and related materiel to Cuba. Address by President
Kennedy, reprinted in ROBERT F. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS: A MEMOIR OF THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 153 (1968). During the course of debates on the matter in the
U.N. Security Council, members differed as to whether the missiles in question were
defensive or offensive, but no one claimed that the American blockade constituted a
state of war. See AREND & BECK, supra note 112.
160. See Ronan, supra note 95, at 645.
161. See 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 579
(4th ed. 1960).
2004]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
other-neither peace nor war."'62 However, in many conflicts, the
belligerents are clearly "up in arms" against one another, casualties
are incurred, appropriations are made by the respective legislative or
parliamentary authorities and other indicia of wartime are in place-
but the parties deny that there is a state of war. Surely, however,
these situations do not constitute a state of peace.
I have selected the following historical examples to illustrate
different ways in which states have engaged in hostilities that they
have denied, with varying degrees of tenacity, constituted a state of
war.
A. United States Naval Operations Against France, 1798-1801
After the United States signed the Jay Treaty, which granted
privileges to Great Britain that had previously been conferred on
France alone, numerous instances of French interdictions against
American shipping occurred.'63 The French seized American vessels
and had them condemned in prize courts. American citizens were
imprisoned, beaten, and other vessels were fired upon, burned and
looted. Diplomatic relations between France and the United States
were broken off in December 1796. The Congress passed laws to
suspend trade between the two countries, to authorize armed vessels
of the United States to seize armed vessels of France for adjudication
as prize, and to recapture American vessels and goods."' The United
States captured as prize about eighty-five French vessels. Despite the
severe and prolonged nature of the conflict, neither the French nor
the U.S. governments considered that a war existed between them,165
and the legislation passed by the Congress referred to "the existing
differences" and justified its move "in case war should break out."' 66
In 1801, the U.S. Senate ratified a Convention that resolved the
dispute, but did not refer to a state of war and the document was not
regarded as a peace treaty.
67
Despite the fact that both the United States and France denied
that a state of war had existed, early cases in the Supreme Court held
162. L.R. 12 Digest 243 (K.B. 1902).
163. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 29.
164. See id.
165. See id. (citing GROB FRITZ, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 37-63
(1949)).
166. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 29.
167. See id. (citing 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 480 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931)).
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that hostilities on the high seas between public armed ships of the
United States and France had constituted a "public war. ' '68 The most
famous of these cases was Bas v. Tingy,69 in which the Court focused
on the congressional authorization of hostilities on the high seas by
certain persons in certain circumstances. Justice Paterson referred to
the operations as "an imperfect war, or a war as to certain objects and
to a certain extent," and Justice Chase referred to the conflict
between America and France as a "limited, partial war."'7° Going
further, Justice Washington stated:
Every contention by force between nations, in external matters,
under the authority of their respective governments, is not only
war, but public war. If it be declared in form, it is called solemn,
and is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with
another whole nation, and all the members of the nation declaring
war, are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of
the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a
war all the members act under a general authority, and all the rights
and consequences of war attach to their condition.
But hostilities may subsist between two nations, more confined in
its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things;
and this is more properly termed imperfect war, because not
solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities
act under special authority, and can go no farther than to the extent
of their commission. Still, however, it is a public war, because it is
an external contention by force between some of the members of
the two nations, authorized by the legitimate powers. It is a war
between the two nations, though all the members are not
authorized to commit hostilities such as in a solemn war, where the
government restrains the general power.171
Each of the justices agreed that a "public war" existed (rather
than a state of reprisals or some other "intermediate" condition),
even though it was being waged in a limited manner. The Court
seemed to have reached this conclusion based on the fact that the
hostilities were ordered or condoned by the political branches of the
168. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); see also Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 37 (1800). But see The Schooner Endeavor, 44 Ct. Cl. 242 (1909); Hooper v.
United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887); Cushing v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 1 (1886);
Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340 (1886).
169. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
170. Id. at 44.
171. Id. at 40-41.
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government. Congress had enacted prize regulations and authorized
American vessels to resist search, even though no declaration of war
had been issued either by France or the United States.
172
For a period of a century or so following Bas v. Tingy, claimants
whose ships and goods had been destroyed or captured by the French
pressed the United States for compensation, based on legislation
enacted by Congress. This culminated in a series of judgments by the
Court of Claims referred to as the French Spoliation Cases.' In
1886, in Gray, Adm'r. v. United States, the Court of Claims appeared
to sidestep Bas v. Tingy, observing:
[T]he political and judicial departments of each Government
recognized the other as an enemy; that battles were fought and
blood shed on the high seas; that property was captured by each
from the other and condemned as prize; that diplomatic and
consular intercourse was suspended, and that prisoners had been
taken by each Government from the other and "held for exchange,
punishment, or retaliation, according to the laws and usages of
war." While these statements may be in substance admitted and
constitute very strong evidence of the existence of war, still they are
not exclusive, and the facts, even if they existed to the extend
claimed, may not be inconsistent with a state of reprisals straining
the relations of the States to their utmost tension, daily threatening
hostilities of a more serious nature, but still short of that war which
abrogates treaties, and after the conclusion of which the parties
must, as between themselves, begin international life anew.
... We are, therefore, of the opinion that no such war existed as
operated to abrogate treaties, to suspend private rights, or to
authorize indiscriminate seizures and condemnations; that, in short,
it was no public general war, but limited war in its nature similar to
a prolonged series of reprisals.
The Court of Claims did not take itself to be contradicting Bas v.
Tingy, because it interpreted that case to hold that the United States
and France were only in "partial warfare,' 75 that is, a limited degree
of hostility carried on without a declaration of war. The court said:
There was no declaration of war; the tribunals of each country were
172. See Ronan, supra note 95, at 645.
173. See id. at 648.
174. 21 Ct. Cl. 340, 367-68, 375 (1886).
175. Id. at 371.
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open to the other-an impossibility were war in progress;
diplomatic and commercial intercourse were admittedly suspended;
but during many years there was no intercourse between England
and Mexico, which were not at war; there was retaliation and
reprisal, but such retaliations and reprisals have often occurred
between nations at peace; there was a near approach to war, but at
no time was one of the nations turned into an enemy of the other in
such manner that every citizen of the one became the enemy of
every citizen of the other; finally, there was not that kind of war
which abrogates treaties and wiped out, at least temporarily, all
pending rights and contracts, individual and national.
176
Another Court of Claims decision dealing with the French
Spoliation Cases held that "within the limits prescribed by Congress
there was war; limited imperfect war, not general public war, but war
complete as to the vessels engaged in it to the extent only of the
powers given by the Congress." 7 ' As late as 1909, another Court of
Claims case involving the French Spoliation Cases, said:
While reprisals are acts of war in fact, it is for the state affected to
determine for itself whether the relation of actual war was intended
by them; ... Congress, in whom the power resides, did not see fit to
declare war, and the hostilities actually carried on were not only
limited but of a defensive character.
178
More recently, the U.S. Navy Department published documents
pertaining to the 1798-1801 conflict with France, referring to "Quasi
War with France." '79 Thus, in the annals of legal history there is a
widely divergent field of opinion as to whether the U.S. naval
operations against France in 1798-1801 constituted a Legal War.
B. Battle of Navarino, 1827
In 1827, when a Greek independence movement against Turkey
was at its height, Great Britain, France and Russia were aligned on a
policy of joint intervention on behalf of the Greek revolutionaries."
The three allies used their naval fleets to blockade Turkish supply
ships bound for Greece. Superior orders to naval commanders
176. Id. at 374.
177. Hooper, Adm'r. v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 429 (1887).
178. The Schooner Endeavor, 44 Ct. Cl. 242 (1909).
179. See Navy Department, Office of Naval Records and Library, Naval
Documents, Quasi War with France, Operations, February 1797-December 1801 (7
vols., 1935-38).
180. See FRITZ, supra note 165, at 84-85.
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prohibited the use of force unless Turkish vessels forced a passage.
Nonetheless, the allied admirals apparently provoked the Turkish
fleet into a battle at the harbor of Navarino. The Turks suffered a
loss 4,000 men and their entire fleet of 60 ships. "When the news
reached the governments of the three Powers they did not consider
that a state of war had arisen and none came into existence. The
British Cabinet regarded 'the battle as an 'accident. ' .'8 1 This battle
illustrates that "in certain situations limited conflicts which result
from accidents, mistaken actions, and unauthorized acts of
subordinates may not cause a major breach of the peace when it is
obvious that no official sanction, previous or ex post facto, is given to
the use of force.... [This conflict] passed as an isolated incident, the
subject merely of a demand for damages and an apology.""'
C. The Indian Wars, 1790-1890
The U.S. Indian wars, which lasted roughly a century, from 1790
to 1890, were undeclared. In Montoya v. United States, the Supreme
Court construed the Indians Depredation Act, by which Congress had
vested the Court of Claims with jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims of
U.S. citizens who had property taken or destroyed, without just cause
or provocation, by Indians belonging to any band, tribe or nation in
friendly relations with the United States. 3 The Act provided for
judgments against the United States and against the tribe itself,
against whom the Government could seek indemnification." The
Act was intended to "impose upon the tribes the duty of holding their
members in check or under control, and for a failure so to do to fix
upon the tribe the responsibility for the acts of individual members
acting in defiance of the authority of their tribe or band ....
Congress did not intend to provide for compensation for
depredations that were part of a hostile demonstration against the
Government or citizens in general because:
[I]f the marauders are so numerous and well organized as to be able
to defy the efforts of the tribe to detain them, in other words, to
make them a separate and independent band, carrying on hostilities
against the United States, it would be obviously unjust to hold the
181. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 31.
182. Id.
183. 180 U.S. 261, 263 (1901) (citing Act of March 3, 1891, 51 Cong. Ch. 538, 26
Stat. 851).
184. See id. at 268.
185. Id.
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tribe responsible for their acts. It can hardly be supposed that
Congress would impose a liability upon tribes in amity with the
United States for the acts of an independent band, strong enough to
defy the authority of the tribe, although it would not be inequitable
to hold the tribe liable for individual members whom it was able,
but had failed, to control1'86
The Court expressed the view that there could not be any
expressed declarations of war against the Indian tribes, which
have as a rule shown a total want of that cohesive force necessary
to the making up of a nation in the ordinary sense of the word....
While, as between the United States and other civilized nations, an
act of Congress is necessary to a formal declaration of war, no such
187
act is necessary to constitute a state of war with an Indian tribe.
The Court added:
We recall no instance where Congress has made a formal
declaration of war against an Indian nation or tribe; but the fact
that Indians are engaged in acts of general hostility to settlers,
especially if the government has deemed it necessary to dispatch a
military force for their subjugation, is sufficient to constitute a state
of war.""
The Court said that the Indian wars constituted a state of war,
but of the "imperfect" type, being "confined in its nature and extent,
being limited as to places, persons and things .... 18 9
The Court held that a band of Indians known as "Victoria's
band" who had broken away from the Mescalero Apache Indians in
Arizona, had embarked on a series of hostile acts against citizens of
the United States (horse stealing, plunder and killing of citizens) until
they were driven out of the country by military forces, "was carrying
on a war against the Government as an independent organization,"
and that therefore the Mescalero tribe was not held responsible for
their acts.
Thus, with respect to the Indian wars the following two principles
appear to have emerged: one, that a state of war can exist even
though one party to the conflict might not be an independent nation,
as the Indian tribes were neither regarded as independent nations or
sovereign states; and two, that separate factions that broke away from
186. Id.
187. Id. at 265,267.
188. Id. at 268.
189. Id. at 267 (quoting Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 40-41 (1800)).
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tribes that were at peace with the United States, and subsequently
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its citizens, were
deemed to be carrying on war against the United States.1' °
D. The "Boxer Uprising," 1900-1901'9'
In 1899 Chinese militia, known as "Boxers," started a violent
campaign against native Christians and foreigners. The accredited
representatives of the United States and other foreign governments
were imprisoned in Peking. By June 1900 the violence was such that
President McKinley, without congressional authorization, sent an
army of 5,000 men and a naval contingent to join a coalition of
Austrian, British, French, German, Japanese, Italian and Russian war
vessels that had assembled at Taku, China. Congress made no
objection to the action of the President."
The Boxers, aided by Chinese Imperial troops, engaged in large
scale fighting with the allied forces. The allies captured the city of
Tientsin on July 14, 1900. In August, allied troops invaded Peking,
pillaged and looted the city, released from prison the foreign
legations, and committed atrocities against the population. They
continued a campaign of expeditions throughout Northern China to
suppress the Boxers, and by October they occupied Paotingfu, the
capital of the Chihli province, and an allied provisional government
was soon established in the occupied region. The deployment of
naval forces by President McKinley was not merely for the purpose of
rescuing and protecting American lives and property, but also to aid
in avenging and punishing the rebels. Yet the President continued to
claim that our goal was solely for the legitimate purpose of rescuing
imperiled citizens and that no "war" was involved.193
During the conflict, diplomatic documents variously referred to
the situation as "war," "actual warfare," "de facto state of war,"
"intervention," "armed intervention," "hostilities," "expedition,"
190. In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe parties belligerent in
a public war are independent nations. But it is not necessary to constitute war, that
both parties should be acknowledged as independent nations or sovereign States. A
war may exist where one of the belligerents, claims sovereign rights as against the
other." 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
191. The account provided herein is attributed to BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 33-
34; see also RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 21-22.
192. Congress neither declared war nor formally ratified the President's decision,
although it recognized a state of war by providing for combat pay. See Act of March
2, 1901, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 903 (1901).
193. See Note, supra note 80, at 1789.
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"military measures" and "warlike acts." Neither the Allies nor the
Chinese Government ever declared war against the other nor did they
regard the conflict to be a "state of war," and in letters to President
McKinley and the German Emperor, the Emperor of China referred
to the "friendly relations" existing between the parties. In addition,
during the conflict third powers were not requested to observe
neutrality, and diplomatic relations remained in place between the
belligerents. The British Prime Minister, in an interview with the
Chinese Minister in London in June 1900, stated that there was no
reason to say that a "time of war" existed. In September 1901, the
Powers signed what was distinctly not termed a peace treaty, but a
"Final Protocol," consisting of twelve articles, none of which referred
to war, which provided for the settlement of the dispute and the
evacuation of Allied troops.
Notwithstanding the denial of a state of war by the belligerents,
in the case of Hamilton v. McClaughry, a U.S. court of appeals held
that the Boxer Uprising was a "time of war" within the meaning of
the fifty-eighth Article of War, which provided for certain offenses
committed by soldiers in time of war, so that the murder of a fellow
serviceman in China constituted offense triable by court-martial."94
After stating that the existence of a state of war is a political question,
and that it was bound by the determination of that issue by the
political department of the government, the court paradoxically
ignored the statements of the Executive branch, and instead
examined other elements. The court concluded that the Boxer
Rebellion was a "time of war" because of
The occupation.., by the large military force ... the many conflicts
between the forces of this government and the armed Chinese
troops, and the recognition of a condition of war by the
Congress... in making payment to the officers and men.., on a
war basis, and all the other facts and circumstances.'95
The court also observed that during the Boxer Uprising there
were 271 trials by general court-martial, which resulted in 244
convictions.' The court said that a formal declaration of war "is
unnecessary to constitute a condition of war.... [T]he question here
is whether this government was, at the time of the commission of this
homicide by petitioner, prosecuting its right in Chinese territory by
194. 136 F. 445 (10th Cir. 1905).
195. Id. at 449, 451 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 448.
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force of arms."197 The court concluded that:
[W]hen the armed forces of this government, by authority of the
Department of War, are commissioned to enforce the lawful
demands of this government against a foreign country, or to protect
the lives of citizens lawfully stationed in a foreign country, or the
accredited representatives of this government in such foreign
country, there must exist military jurisdiction and power to enforce
such discipline among the troops as will command the respect of
foreign nations, assure the safety of the nonoffending citizens of
such foreign nation and their property, and protect the lives and the
citizens of this country engaged in such military operations.' 98
According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the intervention in China
was the first significant action against a sovereign state by the United
States and marked a new era in Presidential war powers. '99
E. The Joint Blockade by Germany, Great Britain and Italy
against Venezuela, 1902-1903201
In 1902, as a result of the Venezuelan government's refusal to
honor its contract debts owed to citizens of Germany, Great Britain
and Italy, the three European governments formed a coalition and
seized most of the Venezuelan fleet. At Puerto Cabello, a Venezuela
mob seized and looted a British steamer and imprisoned her officers
and crew. British and German cruisers shelled two forts at Puerto
Cabello after local authorities refused to apologize for the incident.
The allied forces then notified other nations that they were
blockading the Venezuelan ports, and that vessels of third states
attempting to violate the blockade were to be subject to seizure and
trial in a prize court. In February 1903, through the mediation of the
United States, the conflict was settled, the blockade ended, and
captured ships were restored.
Was this blockade a Legal War? There was a simple exchange of
protocols, and no treaty of peace was drafted. One commentator at
the time described the conflict as "war sub modo" and
"anomalous, '"0' and another referred to it as "essentially a pacific
197. Id. at 449-50.
198. Id. at 450.
199. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 89-90 (1973).
200. The account provided herein is attributed to BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 35-
36; see also RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 23-24.
201. Sir Thomas Erskine Holland, War Sub Modo, 19 L.Q. Rev. 133 (1903).
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blockade."'2 2 The German government initially held to the position
that the blockade was a "pacific blockade," but later asserted that it
was a "warlike blockade" and that a state of war existed. The British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that "the establishment of
a blockade created ipso facto a state of war between Great Britain
and Venezuela." Thus, under the state of war doctrine, a war existed
in the legal sense inasmuch as the states concerned stated that it
existed. Moreover, in an award of February 22, 1904, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague referred to the "war between the
blockading Powers and Venezuela" in the Venezuelan Preferential
Claims case.03
F. The United States Occupation of Vera Cruz, 1914 204
In April 1914, three crewmembers of the U.S.S. Dolphin were
improperly arrested at Tampico by soldiers of the army of General
Huerta, who headed the provisional government of Mexico. The
prisoners were soon released, but a conflict arose after General
Huerta failed to satisfy the regional commander of the American
naval forces with an apology and special ceremony that the
commander had demanded. President Wilson immediately requested
that Congress authorize the use of armed forces so as to obtain from
General Huerta "fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the
United States."2 5 Congress then passed a joint resolution stating:
That the President is justified in the employment of armed forces of
the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends
for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United
States.
Be it further resolved, That the United States disclaims any hostility
206to the Mexican people or any purpose to make war on Mexico.
It should be observed that this resolution, by its own terms, was
not a declaration of war.0' U.S. forces seized the customs-house at
202. 20PPENHEIM, supra note 54, at 146 n.1; cf. HERBERT W. BRIGGS, LAW OF
NATIONS 959 (2d ed. 1952).
203. JAMES BROWN ScoTr, HAGUE COURT REPORTS 56 (1916); MANLEY OTrMER
HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 608 (3d ed. 1951).
204. The account provided herein is attributed to BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 36-
37; see also, RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 24-25.
205. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 36.
206. See BROWNLIE, supra note 7 (citing Mexican Disturbances, 63 Pub. Res. 22;
38 Stat. 770 (1914)).
207. Compare the text of declarations of war of Congress set forth supra at notes
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Vera Cruz to prevent arms which were expected to arrive there from
falling into the hands of General Huerta. After several days of severe
fighting, American forces gained control over the whole city, and
remained in occupation until November 23, 1914.
Was this invasion and occupation a Legal War? It seems that the
U.S. government expressly denied a state of war. Senator Root in
Congress stated that the operation was justified as a reprisal or an
intervention to protect American lives and property. 208 The U.S.
Secretary of State denied that a state of war existed.2 9 More likely,
the action was a means of salvaging national pride and to affect a
regime-change of the government of General Huerta, whose regime
had been popularly denounced as a "government by murder.""2 ' On
the other hand, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a note
to the American charge d'affaires stating that "According to
international law, those acts of the armed forces of the United
States ... must be understood as the initiation of war against
Mexico. 211
G. The Pershing Expedition into Mexico, 1916212
In March 1916 the United States invaded Mexico in search of the
Mexican commander, Pancho Villa, and his army, who had raided a
town in New Mexico. President Wilson ordered a punitive expedition
under the command of General John J. Pershing into Mexico. The
President stated that:
[T]he expedition is simply a necessary punitive measure, aimed
solely at the elimination of the marauders who raided Columbus
[New Mexico] and who infest an unprotected district near the
border which they use as a base in making attacks upon the lives
and property of our citizens within our own territory. It is the
purpose of our commanders to cooperate in every possible way
with the forces of General Carranza [the de facto head of Mexico]
in removing this cause of irritation to both governments and to
retire from Mexican territory so soon as that object is
97-103.
208. Editorial Comment, Mediation in Mexico, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 579, 581-82 (1914)
(quoting Senator Root).
209. See U.S. For. Rel. 1914, 490,493.
210. RIFAAT, supra note 1, at 25.
211. BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 37.
212. The account provided herein is attributed to BROWNLIE, supra note 7, at 37.
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accomplished."'
214Congress approved of this action. The U.S. Senate adopted
resolutions that stated in part:
Whereas the President has obtained the consent of the de facto
government of Mexico for this punitive expedition; and
Whereas the President has given assurance... that the military
operations now in contemplation will be scrupulously confined to
the object already announced, and that in no circumstance will they
be suffered to trench in any degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico
or develop into intervention of any kind; Therefore be it
Resolved... That the use of the armed forces of the United States
for the sole purpose of apprehending and punishing the lawless
band of armed men who entered the United States from Mexico on
the 9th day of March, 1916, committed outrages on American soil,
and fled into Mexico, is hereby approved....215
President Wilson may have been more timid than presidents
today insofar as deferring to Congress with respect to approval of
military operations falling short of war. This language, authorizing
the President's "expedition" for the limited purpose of restoring civil
order, does not rise to a declaration of war.
Soon, General Carranza denounced the American punitive
expedition "as an invasion without Mexico's consent, without its
knowledge, and without the cooperation of its authorities," and
demanded the immediate withdrawal under threat of military
retaliation.216 Numerous clashes occurred between U.S. troops and
regular Mexican forces inasmuch as American forces remained in the
region and patrolled a portion of Mexico to protect the American
border. In July 1916, a series of conferences took place in
Washington in an effort to mediate a settlement of the conflict. A
peaceful settlement was reached and American forces withdrew from
Mexico in February 1917. At no time did either the United States or
213. The Confidential Agent of the de facto Government of Mexico to the
Secretary of State, 10 AM. J. INT'L L. 191 (Official Document Supp. 1916); see also
George A. Finch, Mexico and the United States, 11 AM. J. INT'L L. 399, 400 (1917).
214. A resolution approving the use of armed forces passed the Senate but did not
come up for a vote in the House. See Background Information on the Use of United
States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries: Hearings on War Powers Legis. Before the
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (1971).
215. S. Res., 64th Cong., 53 CONG. REc. 4274 (1916).
216. Finch, supra note 213, at 401.
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Mexico claim that a state of war existed. However, the Pershing
Expedition was said to have been war by the Texas Court of Appeals,
which reversed the conviction of several Mexican soldiers who were
tried in the Texas state courts for murder with respect to one of the
regular army battles that occurred in the conflict. The court said that
the matter of trial and punishment of the captured soldiers was
subject to an international or federal question, and not a state matter,
because the killing occurred in the context of a state of war.
We know, as a matter of history... that the United States invaded
Mexico, with a column of troops .... It is not the purpose of this
opinion to go into the history of the trouble between the two
countries and the incidental fights and battles which may have
occurred in connection with those troubles. Suffice it to say they
did occur, and under the authorities this brought about a condition
of war between the two countries.... There was no formal
declaration of war.... That a state of warfare existed between the
217two countries is not questioned .
The foregoing are obviously not exhaustive of 19th and 20th
centuries cases in which states denied that a state of war existed
despite the use of force. However, these cases have the following
factors in common with one another: (1) they pertain to operations
which had a limited purpose; (2) the operations did not have the
purpose of conquering or annexing the opponent; (3) they involved
conflicts that were limited in geographical terms or in the numbers of
forces involved, or both; and (4) the states in contention denied that
there was a state of war.
VI. Modern Case Studies of Conflicts
A. Was the American Civil War a War in the Legal Sense?
Even before President Lincoln issued a proclamation ordering a
blockade of the Southern ports in 1861, federal and state courts
generally ruled that a state of war existed, despite the absence of a
declaration of Congress.218  President Lincoln had, without
authorization from Congress, directed the blockade of Southern ports
217. Arce v. State, 202 S.W. 951, 951-52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918).
218. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); A. Lewis & Co. v.
Ludwick, 46 Tenn. (1 Cold.) 368, 373 (1869). But see The Protector, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 700, 702 (1872); Gooding v. Varn, 10 F. Cas. 601, 601 (D.S.C. 1869) (No. 5539).
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on April 19 and April 27, 1861.29 This appears to have been a
substitute for a declaration of war or, at any rate, an act evidencing a
state of undeclared war.22' As a result, Union vessels captured four
ships off the coast of the Confederacy and brought them to port in
order to be labeled as prizes. Their seizure and condemnation were
sustained in a 5 to 4 decision by the Supreme Court in the Prize
Cases."2 The Court reasoned that actual war existed although there
had been no declaration of war. The Court said: "A state of actual
war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party;
and this is true of both a civil and foreign war.,
22
The Court in effect approved an expanding power of the
President to make war without prior authorization under the theory
that the President has unlimited power to wage war in defending
against an invasion or rebellion, which is how the secession of the
South was characterized. The Court said that "[t]he President was
bound to meet it [the secession of Southern states] in the shape it
presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a
name; and no name given to it by him could change the fact., 223 The
Court approved the theory of defensive war, stating "[I]f a war be
made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only
authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the
war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any
special legislative authority.,
221
The Court also recognized that the President was to be the sole
judge of when an invasion or rebellion amounted to "war." The
Court said:
219. See CORWIN, supra note 13, at 277-78. The proclamation of the President
stated that the President has:
[D]eemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States
aforesaid [the States referred to in the recitals] in pursuance of the laws of
the United States and of the law of nations, in such case made and
provided.... If, therefore, with a view to violate such blockade, a vessel
shall approach or shall attempt to leave either of said ports, she will be duly
warned by the commander.., and if the same vessel shall again attempt to
enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to the
nearest convenient port for such proceedings against her and her cargo, as
prize, as may be deemed advisable.
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 684 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
220. See Eagleton, supra note 13, at 25.
221. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 635.
222. Id. at 640.
223. Id. at 669.
224. Id. at 668.
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Whether the President in fulfilling his duties as Commander-in-
Chief, in suppressing an insurrection had met with such armed
resistance... as will compel him to accord to them the character of
belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must
be governed by the decision and acts of the political department of
the Government to which this power was entrusted.225
This language is important because it indicates that the President
rather than Congress may determine that a state of war exists or has
been thrust upon the nation, as distinguished from making a
declaration of war. At any rate, the Prize Cases has been construed
to validate a broad power of the President to order troops into
combat without express authorization from the Congress. 226  The
actions taken by President Lincoln during the Civil War "served
vastly to expand Presidential prerogatives and to accumulate a
storehouse of precedents for strong executive initiative in military
conflicts not only of a domestic nature but also with regard to foreign
nations.
227
The Prize Cases remains uncontroverted today, but there was a
compelling dissent, joined by Chief Justice Taney, that stated:
[T]here was no existing war between the United States and the
States in insurrection within the meaning of the law of nations,
which drew after it the consequences of a public or civil
war .... [N]o civil war existed between this Government and the
States in insurrection till recognized by the Act of Congress 13th of
July, 1861; that the President does not possess the power under the
Constitution to declare war or recognize its existence within the
meaning of the law of nations, which carries with it belligerent
rights, and thus change the country and all its citizens from a state
of peace to a state of war; that this power belongs exclusively to the
Congress of the United States, and, consequently, that the
President had no power to set on foot a blockade under the law of
nations, and that the capture of the vessel and cargo.., in all cases
225. Id. at 670.
226. According to one commentator, the holding of the Prize Cases is:
[B]road enough to empower the President to do much more than merely
parry a blow already struck against the nation. Properly construed, in truth,
it constitutes juristic justification of the many instances in our history
(ranging from Jefferson's dispatch of a naval squadron to the Barbary Coast
to the 1962 blockade of Cuba) in which the President has ordered belligerent
measures abroad without a state of war having been declared by Congress.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE REINS OF POWER 98 (1963).
227. Robert E. Gilbert, The President's Power to Make War, 42 UMKC L. REV.
156, 166-67 (1973).
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before us ... for breach of blockade, or as enemies' property, are
illegal and void .... 28
This sentiment was echoed by the Supreme Court of Texas in
Bishop v. Jones & Petty, a case in which a principal issue was whether
the Civil War was a Legal War.229 The court refused to take judicial
notice of such facts as: the establishment of the various secession
conventions and election of provisional governments by Confederate
states early in 1861; the election of Jefferson Davis as president; the
dispatch of U.S. troops to reinforce Fort Pickens; the deployment of
U.S. war vessels; and numerous other facts. The Court said that the
belief that war existed in March 1861, the time of the cause of action,
various:
[T]hreatening aggressions had been meekly borne. When armies,
forts, arsenals, public property, and vessels had been captured, no
resistance had been made. When the flag had been fired on, no
shot had been returned. When all these immense trainings and
preparations were going on, congress remained silent. When states
declared that they were out of the union, the public authorities took
no notice of the fact.
The court made a distinction between the "popular sense" of war
and Legal War:
War does not exist merely on the suspension of the usual relations
of peace. Commerce may be interdicted without producing it.
Reprisals and embargoes are forcible measures of redress, but do
not, per se, constitute war. Hostile attacks and armed invasions of
the territory or jurisdiction of a nation, accompanied by the
destruction of life and property by officers acting under the
sanction and authority of their governments, however great and
flagrant provocations to war, are often atoned for and adjusted
without its ensuing. War in its legal sense has been aptly defined to
be "the state of nations among whom there is an interruption of all
pacific relations, and a general contestation of arms authorized by
the sovereign." It is true, it may and has frequently in latter times
been commenced and carried on without either a notice or
declaration. But still, there can be no war by its government, of
which the court can take judicial knowledge, until there has been
some act or declaration creating or recognizing its existence by that
department of the government clothed with the war-making
228. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 686, 698-99 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
229. 28 Tex. 294 (1866).
230. Id. at 300-01.
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231power.
B. Was the Korean Conflict a War in the Legal Sense?
It was not until the Korean conflict that another extensive and
long-lasting state of hostilities existed without a formal declaration of
war. There was a split of opinion as to whether the Korean conflict
was in fact a Legal War. Sir Hersh Lauterpacht labeled the conflict as
hostilities for the "collective enforcement" of international law.232
The U.N. Command in the Korean conflict declared its intention to
observe the laws of war and the rules of the Geneva Conventions of
1949.233 President Truman committed forces to combat on the
grounds that it was necessary to repel the invaders, and that without
immediate action Korea would have been overpowered.M The
Administration described the conflict as a mere "police action," '235
suggesting that the President had deployed forces for purposes short
of war without congressional authorization pursuant to his inherent
power as Commander-in-Chief.
Cases construing the Uniform Code in the context of the Korean
War appear to have steadfastly held that the conflict was a major war.
These cases generally relied on an objective analysis of such criteria
as the number of troops ultimately deployed, the number of casualties
incurred, the extent of emergency legislation that was enacted and the
total costs.
236
Cases during this period appear to have analyzed the notion of
the geographic scope of war. Wars often have a geographic
limitation, so that we might employ such terms as "theatres of war,"
or "regions of warfare." Assuming that we can establish that there is
a state of war, one might inquire as to what the geographic scope of
the war is. This issue became important in considering whether,
under the Uniform Code, the statute of limitations is suspended
worldwide or only in the combat zone in time of war. This issue is
associated with the doctrine of "imperfect war," a concept that was
first enunciated in American law by Justices Washington and
231. Id. at 319.
232. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 54, at 224-25.
233. See Stevens, supra note 49, at 26.
234. See Note, supra note 80, at 1791.
235. See LECKIE, supra note 117, at 858.
236. See Note, supra note 80, at 1792.
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Patterson in Bas v. Tingy.237 The Court held that the armed conflict
between France and the United States had been "an imperfect war, or
a war as to certain objects and to a certain extent. ''238  Justice
Patterson construed the scope of the war to be limited to maritime
engagements on the seas. This concept of geographical limitations on
the scope of a war, as a particular species of warfare, has been
recognized in subsequent cases.
239
It has been suggested that modern war is global war in effect, and
that this justifies the suspension of the statute of limitations
everywhere as well as the worldwide application of desertion in time
of war, both within and without the combat zone.2' ° The Navy Court
of Military Review held, in United States v. Robertson, that if it is
established that "time of war" provisions of the Uniform Code are in
effect, then the statute of limitations is suspended worldwide, not
simply in the combat zone.24 1
In United States v. Ayers, the Court of Military Appeals
considered a case involving an unauthorized absence from Fort
Lewis, Washington, which occurred on December 23, 1950, during the
Korean conflict. The question was, first, whether the Korean conflict
triggered the "time of war" provisions of the Uniform Code, and if so,
whether the "time of war" provision would serve to suspend the
statute of limitations for an offense of desertion that took place
outside the combat zone.4 2 The Court held to a "yardstick of
practicality, ' ,2" reasoning that there was a state of war
notwithstanding the conflict being undeclared by the Congress, and
that given the potential global impact of war in an atomic age, an
unauthorized absence of a soldier in the United States was just as
grave a matter as an unauthorized absence of a soldier in the combat
zone itself. The court said:
When asked-as now-to differentiate in result between an
unauthorized absence occurring within the continental United
States and one arising in Korea, we recognize immediately that,
237. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
238. Id. at 45.
239. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801); Hamilton v. McClaughry,
136 F. 445, 448 (10th Cir. 1905) (holding that a state of war existed "in China"); Arce
v. State, 202 S.W. 951, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1918).
240. See Pye, supra note 79at 52.
241. 1 M.J. 934 (1976).
242. 4 C.M.A. 220 (1954).
243. Id. at 221.
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whether the defection occurs at a port of embarkation on the eve of
shipment of personnel, or following a unit's arrival in Korea, we are
faced with essentially the same problem. In either instance the
Armed Forces are deprived of a necessary-perhaps vitally
244
necessary-combat replacement.
The court, perhaps inappropriately, relied upon the holdings of
civil cases that had construed wartime exclusionary clauses in life
insurance contracts involving soldiers who had died in the Korean
conflict.
In another case, United States v. Anderson, it was held that a
soldier who left his army unit in Louisiana without permission on
November 3, 1964, could be charged without regard to the statute of
limitations because the offense occurred during the Vietnam conflict,
which the court construed to be in a "time of war., 24'5 And with
respect to the geographic scope of a war, the court took the view that
given the nature of modern warfare, especially airlift techniques for
the transportation of large numbers of troops thousands of miles
away, a soldier who left a unit which was destined for the war zone
might be said to have committed as serious an offense as a soldier
who deserted in the combat zone. However, there was no evidence
before the court that Anderson's unit was anticipated to be sent
shortly overseas or that Anderson was engaged in any activity directly
connected to the war effort. It is therefore questionable whether
Anderson's AWOL from a Louisiana base in 1964 imposed any
different influence on manpower, combat readiness, and morale than
any peacetime AWOL.
In United States v. Taylor, 6 a similar result was reached
regarding the Korean conflict in a case involving the suspension of
the statute of limitations under Article 43(f) of the Uniform Code,
involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States.247 The
case involved the court-martial of an accused for fraudulently
enlisting in the U.S. Army during the Korean conflict.2"4 The court
affirmed the suspension of the statute of limitations in this matter. 9
Chief Judge Quinn dissented in both the Ayers and Taylor cases,
244. Id. at 220, 225.
245. 17 C.M.A. 588,590 (1968).
246. 4 C.M.A. 232 (1954).
247. 10 U.S.C. § 843(f) (1986).
248. United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232, 234 (1954).
249. Id. at 240.
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urging: that while there may have been a state of war in Korea, "the
entire genius of our Government's policy in the Korean crisis was to
confine the hostilities and its consequences to the combat zone"; that
the Korean conflict did not precipitate U.S. entry into a full-scale
state of war; and that the suspension of the statute of limitations
should not, in any event, apply to a soldier located within the United
States.25° Judge Quinn cogently argued that Congress and the
President regarded the Korean conflict as limited in place, purpose
and in its consequences. He pointed out that one day after President
Truman ordered military support for South Korea, Senator Taft
stated in the Senate that this commitment meant de facto war, but
that this was not to be regarded as a war extending to the continental
United States. Senator Taft "considered the President's action as
only a new executive development of the foreign policy of the United
States which brought danger of war, but not war itself., 251 Senator
Douglas stated that he did not regard Korea as indicating a state of
war in the continental United States, and similar expressions of
Congressional opinion on the floor of both houses of Congress
occurred.252
Judge Quinn also noted: that when the Communist aggression
began in Korea, Congress extended the Selective Service Act of 1948
for only one year; that there was a limitation written into the
Universal Military Training and Service Act on June 19, 1951, which
expressly prohibited extension of certain enlistments without consent,
in the absence of a war or national emergency declared by Congress;
that Congress extended the grant of free mail privileges to military
personnel only in Korea and combat zones designated by the
President, but that in general wartime conditions the privilege is
extended within as well as without the United States; and that
Congress granted the exclusion of pay from income tax only to those
serving in a combat zone, as designated by the President, whereas in
time of general war this exclusion is customarily granted to all
personnel on active duty, wherever the place of service.253 Moreover,
in 1950, the President suspended the Table of Maximum Punishments
only in the Far East command, whereas in World War II the
President had suspended the Table for every part of the world in
250. Id. (Quinn, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Ayers, 4 C.M.A. 220, 228 (1954)
(Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
251. United States v. Ayers, 4 C.M.A. at 228 (citing 96 Cong. Rec. 9322 (1950)).
252. See id. at 229.
253. See id.
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which American forces were located.5
Judge Quinn also pointed out that the reliance by the majority
on insurance cases construing the Korean conflict are not germane to
the issue in the case, for "[t]he meaning of a public law is to be found
in what Congress itself has done and said" rather than in what courts
say with respect to the interpretation of insurance contracts.2
Thus, a persuasive argument was made that the Korean conflict,
while constituting a state of war, was limited in scope, and did not
intimate a state of war within the territorial limits of the United
States.
United States v. Bancroft256 involved a soldier accused and
convicted for sleeping on post during the Korean conflict, a charge
that carries a possible death penalty if committed during wartime.
The U.S. Court of Military Appeals expressly rejected the need to
consider a formal declaration of war as a condition precedent to
finding a "time of war," saying:
We believe a finding that this is a time of war, within the meaning
of the language of the Code, is compelled by the very nature of the
present conflict; the manner in which it is carried on; the movement
to, and the presence of large numbers of American men and
women on, the battlefields of Korea; the casualties involved; the
sacrifices required; the drafting of recruits to maintain the large
number of persons in the military service; the national emergency
legislation enacted and being enacted; the executive orders
promulgated; and the tremendous sums being expended for the
express purpose of keeping our Army, Navy and Air Force in the
Korean theatre of operations .... [A]n appreciation of the size of
the forces involved; a recognition of the efforts, both military and
civilian, being expended to maintain the military operations in that
area; and knowledge of other well-publicized wartime activities
convinces us beyond any reasonable doubt that we are in a highly
developed state of war .... It would indeed be an insult to the
efforts of those servicemen who are daily risking their lives in
defense of democratic principles to hold that peacetime conditions
257prevail.
The court noted that civilian courts in some instances held that a
254. See id. at 230 (citing Exec. Order No. 10,149, 15 Fed. Reg. 5149 (Aug. 8,
1950)).
255. Id. at 231.
256. 3 C.M.A. 3, 4 (1953).
257. Id. at 5-6.
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formal declaration of war is a condition required in order for a state
of war to exist, but that "the reasons which are influential there are
not persuasive here. For our purposes we need not get into the
refinements of those cases which interpret the terms of a contract nor
decide whether we are engaged in a de facto or de jure war. Practical
considerations are more important .... 258  One commentator has
noted that military holdings in the foregoing cases seem to find a state
of war more readily than cases in municipal law because:
[T]he exigencies of the military situation are the same whether
there is a declared war or a mere outbreak of hostilities. Clearly,
the operation of the maximum punishment provisions should be the
same for the guard who slept at his post in a bunker along the Yalu
as it was for one who slept at his post on a front line in World War
II. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that Congress intended
that the "wartime" sections of the Code should be operative
whenever persons subject to the Code were actively engaged in
hostilities. 
9
One other case involving the Korean conflict pertained to
whether war existed for the purpose of determining veteran's
preference points. In Freed v. Baldi, the Colorado Supreme Court
considered whether someone who had served in the Korean conflict
had served "in the armed forces of the United States in time of war"
for purposes of being entitled to certain veterans' preference points
under the Colorado Constitution. 26 The court held in the negative,
finding, first, that the people of Colorado had intended the phrase "in
times of war" to mean only war "officially declared by Congress," and
second, that the Korean conflict was never formalized by a
declaration of war. 6
As we can see, one of the problems with undeclared conflicts
such as Korea is ascertaining when mere "police action" has escalated
into a Legal War. At what point in time will the commitment of
troops into foreign military action and other criteria become "war"?
Is it when the casualties reach a certain figure, and if so what level-
5,000 or 10,000, more than that, or less? And who would determine
when that point was reached? Or, does military action become war
when a certain period of time has elapsed? What other criteria other
258. Id. at 6.
259. Pye, supra note 79, at 47.
260. Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d 716, 718 (Colo. 1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 317
(1969).
261. Id. at 719.
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than the level of troops are relevant? These are questions for which
there are no straightforward answers.
C. Was the Vietnam War a War in the Legal Sense?
American involvement in Vietnam began with the gradual
infiltration of guerrilla fighters from North Vietnam into South
Vietnam. From 1959 to 1960, an estimated 2,700 or more Viet Cong
crossed the frontier. By 1965, Viet Cong forces under the direction
of the military High Command in Hanoi numbered 35,000 regular
forces and as many as 80,000 irregular forces.263 Soon thereafter, the
conflict involved hundreds of thousands of soldiers of several nations.
On March 4, 1965, the Department of State issued the following
statement:
The fact that military hostilities have been taking place in Southeast
Asia does not bring about the existence of a state of war, which is a
legal characterization of a situation rather than a factual
description. What we have in Viet Nam is armed aggression from
the North against the Republic of Viet Nam. Pursuant to South
Vietnamese request and consultations between our two
Governments, South Viet Nam and the United States are engaged
in collective defense against that armed aggression. The inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense is recognized in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.264
Since war was never declared in Vietnam, the question arises
whether there was a time of Legal War. The evidence in support of
that is the magnitude of the conflict in terms of total forces, casualties,
money and material expended, and the acts of the political
departments concerning the hostilities.26  Among the acts of the
political departments, in August 1964, Congress passed a joint
resolution authorizing the President to take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack by the forces of the Communist regime in
North Vietnam.66 Congress later appropriated special funds for the
262. See Stevens, supra note 49, at 24.
263. Id.
264. Dep't State Bull., Vol. LII, No. 1343 at 403 (Mar. 22, 1965).
265. See Stevens, supra note 49, at 26.
266. Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security in Southeast Asia, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384
(1964) [hereinafter Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]. This congressional action was
prompted by attacks by the North Vietnamese against ships of the U.S. Navy in the
Gulf of Tonkin on August 4, 1964. See Dep't State Bull., Vol. LI, No. 1313 at 262 et
seq. (Aug. 24, 1964).
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evacuation of dependents in Vietnam, and made provision for free
postal service, income tax exclusions, the establishment of the
Vietnam service medal and special combat pay for soldiers in the
combat zone.267 The President referred to the conflict as a "war" that
was "dirty and brutal and difficult. '' 2' Thus, as in the case of the
Korean conflict, once the quantum of executive orders, emergency
legislation, and speeches or statements by the executive branch
supportive of a conflict reached a certain threshold, courts construing
the wartime provisions of the Uniform Code found in most instances
find that a state of war existed.
In United States v. Robertson,269 the Navy Court of Military
Review considered whether there was a "time of war" that suspended
the two year statute of limitations for unauthorized absence that
occurred from December 27, 1972 to May 21, 1975.270 The court held
that the Vietnam War formally terminated when the Paris peace
agreement was signed on January 27, 1973.271 Thus, the court held
that December 27, 1972 was a "time of war" within the meaning of
Article 43(a). The court wasted no time in referring to the Vietnam
conflict as a "time of war." Its only concern was whether the state of
war might have ended prior to the Paris peace agreement such that
the statute of limitations would have operated to bar the action
against the soldier in this instance.
Broussard v. Patton involved a case of desertion in which the
court of appeals considered the definition of "time of war" for
purposes of suspension of the statute of limitations with respect to the
Vietnam conflict.272 The court adhered to a de facto notion of war
273
rather than requiring a formal declaration of Congress. The court
allowed the military to define "time of war" retroactively so as to
267. Stevens, supra note 49, at 27.
268. Id. (quoting a speech by President Johnson at Johns Hopkins University on
April 7, 1965).
269. 1 M.J. 934 (1976).
270. Article 43(a) of the Uniform Code then provided: "(a) A person charged with
desertion or absence without leave in time of war, or with aiding the enemy, mutiny,
or murder, may be tried and punished at any time without limitation." 50 U.S.C.
§618(a) (1950) (emphasis added). The present provision, amended in 1986, has
slightly different wording: "A person charged with absence without leave or missing
movement in time of war, or with any offense punishable by death, may be tried and
punished at any time without limitation." 10 U.S.C. §843(a) (2003).
271. United States v. Robertson, 1 M.J. at 935.
272. 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1973), rehearing
denied, 411 U.S. 923 (1973).
273. Id. at 819.
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reimpose court-martial jurisdiction on soldiers who had returned to
civilian life.' Broussard deserted on October 1, 1964.275 On
December 6, 1967, the military advised him that they were "making
no further effort to apprehend [him] ... since he [was] a peacetime
deserter and, as such the Statute of Limitations [had] expired. 276 In
1969, however, he was informed that he was being sought because a
decision in another case held that a time of war had existed prior to
the date of his desertion, and therefore the statute of limitations for
the charge of desertion had been suspended.277 Broussard was then
tried and convicted in court-martial.2 78  The decision makes it
apparent how grossly unpredictable the approach can be to "time of
war" issues vis-d-vis military jurisdiction.279 The Broussard case could
be extended to include acts of civilians accompanying armed forces or
for penalty enhancement, or other purposes in situations that might
be thought of as time of peace but which can be determined to be
time of war, retroactively.2
More recently, in United States v. Dienst, the Air Force Court of
Military Review held that the Vietnam conflict was a "time of war"
such as to allow the trial and punishment of a person charged with
desertion without limitation."'
Some cases suggested that the Vietnam conflict was a time of war
based largely upon the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. In United States v.
Anderson, the Court of Military Appeals expressed a split as to the
significance of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.2 The issue was
whether the Vietnam conflict constituted a "time of war" so that the
statute of limitations was suspended with respect to a soldier charged
with absence without leave. 283 The court's opinion held that the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution by Congress on August 10, 1964,2" in response to
the attack by North Vietnamese forces on the U.S. destroyers
Maddox and C. Turner Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin, constituted
274. Id. at 818.
275. Id. at 817.
276. Id. at 819.
277. Id. at 820.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, "Time of War" and the War Powers
Resolution, 49 IND. L.J. 436, 441 (1974).
281. United States v. Dienst, 16 M.J. 727 (1983).
282. 17 C.M.A. 588, 590 (1968).
283. Id. at 589.
284. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, supra note, 266.
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"official recognition" that the United States was engaged in a state of
war.285 Two of the three judges concurred in the result but disagreed
over the correct construction of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.' The
court noted that Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach,
testified to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967, that the
Administration regarded the resolution as participation by Congress
"in the functional way.., contemplated by the Founding Fathers" to
"invoke the.., war powers." 287 While the Tonkin Resolution might
not be a formal declaration of war, it nonetheless "clearly indicates
that Congress also recognized and declared, as a legislative decision,
that the Gulf of Tonkin attack precipitated a state of armed conflict
between the United States and North Vietnam.'
Judge Kilday, concurring, noted that the power of Congress to
declare war and the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief
are "very closely entwined," 9 and that the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, to his thinking, did not constitute a declaration of war,
but simply asserted the resolve of Congress, following the urging of
the President, "to join in affirming the national determination that all
such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its
basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their
freedom."29° The concurring opinion of Judge Ferguson stated that it
was unnecessary to consider or characterize the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution as a declaration of war or as evidence of the existence of a
conflict and that, in effect, the court may simply take judicial notice of
the "continuing casualties among American forces [in Vietnam] and
the expenditure on their efforts of two billion dollars per month. 291
Two Army review board opinions in 1965, after the Resolution,
found that no war had been declared in Vietnam.2"
While the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution's language is undoubtedly a
285. United States v. Anderson, 17 C.M.A. at 589.
286. Id. at 590-94.
287. Id. at 590 (citing Hearings on S. Res. 151, relating to United States
Commitments to Foreign Powers, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. at 161-62 (1967)).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 591 (Kilday, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 594 (Kilday, J., concurring) (quoting from The Situation in Southeast
Asia, Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 333, 110
CONG. REc., 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 18237 (1964)).
291. Id. at 594 (Ferguson, J., concurring)
292. See United States v. Telfare, 36 C.M.R. 665, 667 (1965), appeal denied, 16
C.M.A. 653 (1966); United States v. Greco, 36 C.M.R. 559, 561 (1965).
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congressional acknowledgement that hostilities existed, it differs from
the straightforward formal declarations of war previously issued by
Congress. Furthermore, it was preceded by very little congressional
comment, coming quickly upon the heels of the attacks on the
Maddox and the C. Turner Joy. A number of Senators who voted for
the Resolution suggested that they did not regard it as a formal
declaration of war.
Had Anderson held that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution did not
constitute evidence that there was a state of war, and had the court
instead relied on the approach taking in the Korean conflict cases, the
court may well have held that there was no state of war. For example,
the factual criteria required by United States v. Bancroft-such as "the
movement to, and the presence of large numbers of American men
and women on, the battlefields," "the casualties involved," "the
drafting of recruits to maintain the large number of persons in the
military service," "the national emergency legislation enacted and
being enacted," "the executive orders promulgated," and "the
tremendous sums being expended" in the "theatre of operations" and
"other well-publicized wartime activities 
-were lacking in kind
and degree in Vietnam in November 1964, when Anderson had
absented himself without authority. A major troop buildup did not
occur until the spring of 1965,294 and casualties did not significantly
increase until the fall of that year.9 Moreover, the Tonkin attacks
did not result in requests for supplemental appropriations,296 nor
hasten conscription programs, or cause an increase in the number ofAWOL personnel.2 98  Moreover, tax benefits2" and special mail
293. 3 C.M.A. 3, 6 (1953).
294. DEP'T OF DEF. ANN. REP. FOR FISCAL YEAR 1966, at 5-6 (Statement of Sec'y
of Def. McNamara).
295. See Samuel H. Weissbard and Mark R. Wiener, Military Law-Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution Constitutes Political Recognition of Vietnam Hostilities and
Requires Classification of the Conflict as Time of War, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609,
613 n.37 (1969) (citing Brief for Appellee at app. B, United States v. Anderson, No.
20,775 (C.M.A., June 21, 1968)).
296. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to
Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160,267-68 (3d ed. 1967).
297. See 1966 DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE ANN. REP. 86.
298. See ARMY PROGRESS REPORTS, OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
PERSONNEL, DEP'T OFTHE ARMY, Mar. 31, 1964 to Oct. 30, 1967.
299. Exec. Order No. 11216, 3 C.F.R. 301 (1965), reprinted in 26 U.S.C. § 112
(Supp. 111, 1965-1967) (provided for troop tax benefits retroactively as of Jan. 1,
1964).
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privileges" ° for troops in the combat zone were not ordered until mid-
1965. Therefore, while the Tonkin attacks may have led to a de facto
escalation in Vietnam, under the Bancroft approach there may not
yet have been sufficient facts in place to precipitate a "time of war."
Other cases pertaining to the Vietnam conflict dealt with the
question of whether the Vietnam conflict was a "time of war" that
would confer courts-martial over civilians accompanying the armed
forces in the field. Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code provides: "In
time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in
the field [are subject to trial by court-martial]." '' On this point, it
may be informative to briefly digress to consider the background of
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.
American court-martial jurisdiction over civilians is derived from
the British Articles of War of 1765 which provided that "[aill Suttlers
and Retainers to a Camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with
Our Armies in the Field, though no inlisted Soldiers, are to be subject
to orders, according to the Rules and Discipline of War.' '3 2 In 1775,
the Continental Congress passed a substantially similar provision in
the American Articles of War, and after the U.S. Constitution was
adopted, subsequent versions of the Articles of War contained
substantially similar provisions up to and including the Articles of
War of 1874.303 In the Articles of War of 1916, the Congress expanded
military jurisdiction to include civilians who accompanied the armed
forces outside the territory of the United States in time of peace.3 0
Substantially the same provision was adopted by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice in 1950.305 The traditional wartime jurisdictional
provision over civilians is found in Article 2(10) of the Uniform Code,
and the peacetime application of civilian jurisdiction was set forth in
Article 2(11). However, in a series of cases, the Supreme Court
struck down court-martial jurisdiction over civilians in time of peace,
300. Exec. Order No. 11255, 3 C.F.R. 354 (1965), reprinted in 39 U.S.C. § 4169
(Supp. III, 1965-1967).
301. Uniform Code, art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1956).
302. British Articles of War of 1765, § XIV, art. XXIII, reprinted in WILLIAM W.
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 941 (2d ed. 1920) [hereinafter
WINTHROP].
303. See Thomas R. Crawford, Military Law-Courts-Martial Jurisdiction of
United States Civilians in Vietnam, 49 N.C. L. REV. 188, 189 (1970).
304. See Article of War 2(d), Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1, 39 Stat. 651.
305. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107 (codified as amended at Uniform
Code, 10 U.S.C. 88 801-940 (1964)).
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so that jurisdiction under Article 2(11) no longer is the law.3' 6 Court-
martial jurisdiction over civilian employees of the armed forces is
permissible only in wartime, based on Article 2(10).
Cases involving court-martial jurisdiction over civilians appear to
have construed the Vietnam conflict as not constituting a state of war.
In Robb v. United States, it was held that there could be no
jurisdiction over a civilian employee "serving with or accompanying
an armed force in the field" when the Vietnam conflict had not been
formally declared to be a war by Congress, "despite the fact that the
conflict in Vietnam is a war in the popular sense of the word. 3W
In United States v. Averette, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals
reversed the court-martial of Averette, a civilian employee in charge
of a motor pool at Camp Davies in Vietnam, of conspiracy to commit
larceny and attempted larceny of 36,000 Government-owned
batteries.3 Averette successfully challenged the Army's jurisdiction
by contending that since Congress had not formally declared war, the
Vietnamese conflict did not constitute "a time of war" as would
trigger Article 2(10)."0 Article 2(10) sets forth three conditions in
order for a civilian to be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. The
civilian must be: (1) "serving with or accompanying an armed force";
(2) "in the field"; '10 (3) during a "time of war." The Averette court
306. See, e.g., Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (holding that courts-martial
could not constitutionally try non-capital crimes committed by civilian employees of
the armed forces in time of peace); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361
U.S. 281 (1960) (extending the Grisham holding to cover non-capital crimes
committed by civilian employees of the armed forces in time of peace).
307. 456 F.2d 768,771 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
308. 19 C.M.A. 363,366 (1970).
309. Id. at 365-66.
310. On the question of whether Averette was "in the field" for purposes of
Article 2(10), Averette's counsel argued that Averette was not "in the field" because
that phrase connoted the idea of being in a battlefront arena without civilian forums
to try crimes and the corresponding need for strong discipline. Case Comments, 46
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 629, 633-34 (1971) (citing Brief for Appellant at 2). The
court apparently did not address this issue, but the phrase "in the field," according to
the argument given by the United States, included the city of Saigon where Averette
had been working, and where eighteen enemy battalions were located. See id. at 634.
Moreover, the cases construing the phrase "in the field" as it appeared in the Articles
of War of 1916, from which Article 2(10) was derived, have broadly construed the
term. For example, civilian employees on merchant vessels transporting supplies for
armed forces have been deemed to be "in the field." Shilman v. United States, 73 F.
Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y 1947); In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944); McCune v.
Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943); Ex parte Falls, 251 F. 415 (D.N.J. 1918);
Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
The case of In re DiBartolo, 50 F. Supp. 929, 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), involved a
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found the first two elements applicable to the defendant, but
construed "war" to mean a war formally declared by Congress, and
held that this element was wanting in the case of the Vietnam conflict.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Quinn pointed out that it has
never been the law that the words "in time of war" as used in a
military sense requires a formal declaration of war."
The Averette interpretation of the words "in time of war" rested
in part upon a Colorado insurance case... and a 1920 federal district
court case involving military jurisdiction over an officer.313 The court
refused to renew its inquiry into the meaning of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, and instead said:
civilian employed as a mechanic, under contract with the government during World
War II, who was charged with theft. The court broadly construed the phrase "in the
field," saying:
Since the events material here occurred outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States it is not really necessary to determine whether the armies
were in the field although it is too clear for argument that such was the fact,
that is they were away from their home base and their established location
and on an operational, indeed hostile, mission.
Id.
However, in Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court noted in dictum that "[e]xperts
on military law, the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney General have
repeatedly taken the position that 'in the field' means in an area of actual fighting."
354 U.S. 1, 34 n.61 (1956).
311. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
312. Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masch, 299 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1956). Pyramid Life
Insurance dealt with the death of a policyholder while serving in the armed forces in
Korea. It held that the Korean conflict was not a "time of war" for purposes of
triggering an exception clause in the policy. Id. at 119. However, see infra Part VII,
noting that there are two lines of cases construing "war" clauses in insurance
contracts, with a minority of cases holding that the term "war" should require an
official declaration of war by Congress, and the majority view being that the term
should be understood in its broader, commonly understood sense of armed conflict
between regular combatants.
313. Ex parte Givins, 262 F. 702 (N.D. Ga. 1920), affd Givins v. Zerbst, 255 U.S.
11 (1921). Ex parte Givins involved the issue of whether a captain of the U.S. Army
was subject to court-martial jurisdiction for a murder committed within the United
States, where the trial occurred after the Armistice but before the signing of any
peace treaty. Id. at 703-04. The court said:
[I]t must be held that for military persons, at least, such a time [of war]
continued from the date of the declaration.., by Congress until some
formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. The
rapid movement of soldiers, causing the scattering of witnesses before the
civil courts could act, as well as the necessity of firm discipline and full
control over an army when on a war footing, are prime causes for the
substitution of courts-martial for civil courts in time of war.
Id. at 705.
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We conclude that the words "in time of war" mean, for purposes of
Article 2(10), Code, supra, a war formally declared by Congress....
As a result of the most recent guidance in this area from the
Supreme Court114 we believe that a strict and literal construction of
Article 2(10) would open the possibility of civilian prosecution by
military courts whenever military action on a varying scale of
intensity occurs.315
With the Averette case concluding that the words "in time of
war" in Article 2(10) refer only to a declared war, and with the
Anderson case holding that the same phrase with respect to Article 43
is not limited to declared wars but extends to undeclared wars, the
court has created an internal inconsistency in the Code. Judge Quinn,
who dissented in the Averette case, pointed out that there is no
"compelling or cogent reason" to construe the phrase "in time of
war" differently for different articles of the Uniform Code, and that
in any event there was ample evidence that the Vietnam conflict
constituted a "time of war" despite the absence of a formal
declaration of war.316
The majority in Averette, in construing "time of war" more
narrowly with respect to military jurisdiction over civilian employees
than with respect to enlisted soldiers, believed that this was required
in light of "the most recent guidance in the area from the Supreme
Court....' 317 The Averette court had in mind O'Callahan v. Parker,318
in which the Supreme Court drastically curtailed traditional military
jurisdiction with respect to military servicemen in matters that occur
in time of peace and are not, strictly speaking, connected to matters
of military discipline.3 9 O'Callahan held that if there is time of war,
servicemen are subject to court-martial jurisdiction for all offenses,
but in time of peace court-martial jurisdiction extends only to service-
related offenses.3 2' The majority in Averette appear to have wrongly
construed O'Callahan, which dealt with a soldier in a situation that
314. The court was referring to the decision in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969) (holding that an army sergeant was not amenable to military jurisdiction in
peacetime for the nonmilitary offenses of assault and attempted rape on a girl that
occurred while he was on an evening pass from his army post and in civilian attire,
because the crimes were not "service-connected").
315. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 365.
316. Id. at 366 (Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 365.
318. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
319. Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 364.
320. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273-274.
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clearly constituted a time of peace, who committed an offense
deemed non service-connected. By contrast, the issue in Averette was
whether a civilian contractor accompanying armies in the field and
accused of conspiracy to commit larceny of government property was
subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
The O'Callahan case was more properly construed in United
States v. Taylor, which involved a soldier who was charged with
unauthorized absence, communicating threats to an officer, and
forgery."' The court, in considering the charge of forgery, took note
of the O'Callahan holding that barred court-martial prosecution of
soldiers for non-service related offenses in time of peace.322  In
discussing this issue, the court said that, in the first instance, the
charge of forgery was service-connected (for reasons articulated in
the opinion) and, second, that the offense occurred "in time of war"
as construed by the Anderson case, which, as mentioned above, found
that the United States was at war in Vietnam at least from the date of
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (August 4, 1964).323
At any rate, in 1987 O'Callahan was expressly overruled by the
Supreme Court, which returned to the previous standard permitting
military courts to find subject-matter jurisdiction over members of the
armed services in time of peace simply based on their military
status.324 Thus, peacetime offenses as well as those committed in time
of war are subject to court-martial jurisdiction with respect to service
members, and the present war-peace distinction has relevance now
only with respect to tolling the statute of limitations and triggering
other provisions of the Uniform Code in time of war.
D. Due Process Concerns
The fact that people of common intelligence might literally have
to guess as to whether or not the "time of war" provisions of the




324. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). The majority opinion,
delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, stated:
This case presents the question whether the jurisdiction of a court-martial
convened pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) to try
a member of the armed forces depends on the "service-connection" of the
offense charged. We hold that it does not, and overrule our earlier decision
in O'Callahan v. Parker.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Uniform Code are triggered under a given situation suggests a due
process problem based on vagueness. The diverse ways in which
courts have construed the "time of war" provisions fuels the view that
this provision of law is impermissibly vague in that "men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application . . ."" As a result, people are not afforded the adequate
notice to which they are entitled by the Fifth Amendment's due
process guarantee. The question is important for soldiers in the
combat zone, soldiers serving in units located outside the combat
zone and indeed soldiers throughout the world, as well as civilians
serving with the armed forces in the field, because they all become
subject to harsher disciplinary rules in time of war.
There are greater hurdles to making a convincing due process
vagueness claim in the military context than under municipal law. In
Parker v. Levy, a case construing free speech and other issues
concerning a serviceman accused of "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman," the Supreme Court said that the Uniform Code
"cannot be equated to a civilian criminal code" since it regulates
conduct unregulated in the civilian sphere.326 The Court said that the
proper standard for review of a vagueness challenge to a military
offense is not the one applicable to normal civilian offenses, but the
standard applied to criminal statutes regulating economic affairs, in
which the same high standard of definiteness is not required and
there is a strong presumptive validity of sufficiency of notice. 27 The
Court concluded that the Uniform Code need not meet the same
procedural due process standards as to vagueness as statutes
applicable in the civilian sphere."'
In dissent, Justice Stewart observed:
The question before us is not whether the military may adopt
substantive rules different from those that govern civilian society,
but whether the serviceman has the same right as his civilian
counterpart to be informed as to precisely what conduct those rules
329proscribe before he can be criminally punished for violating them.
Another hurdle to a due process challenge to the Uniform
325. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964). See also Graccio v. Pennsylvania,
382 U.S. 399 (1966); United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 461 (1939). See also Notes, supra note 6, at 850-51.
326. 417 U.S. 733, 749 (1974).
327. Id. at 756.
328. Id. at 751-52.
329. Id. at 787 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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Code's vagueness on when the "time of war" provisions apply is seen
in In re Berue, a case involving military jurisdiction over civilians in
time of war.33 ° The Court dispensed with a due process challenge
regarding the insufficiency of notice when military jurisdiction over
civilians in time of war occurs. The Court said:
[E]xistence of jurisdiction cannot be defeated by lack of consent or
lack of knowledge that such jurisdiction exists. Assuredly one who
committed a crime without knowing that he was thereby subjected
to the jurisdiction of a Federal Court, could not be heard to contest
the jurisdiction on that ground. It is proper, therefore, to
determine the question of jurisdiction upon the facts and
circumstances; it cannot rest upon knowledge or consent.'
Due process concerns could be resolved if Congress amended the
Uniform Code to provide a precise definition of the phrase "in time
of war" or to provided other precise criteria denoting when the "time
of war" provisions apply. One solution would be to amend the
Uniform Code and the War Powers Resolution to define "time of
war" as occurring if the President suspends the Table of Maximum
Punishments by executive order, provided Congress enacts specific
authorization within the timeframe provided under the War Powers
Resolution. By so acting, the President would automatically trigger
the "time of war" provisions in the Uniform Code. This would
eliminate the necessity of a judicial determination of the existence of
war when there has not been a formal declaration by Congress. It
would further provide for the military's need to insure discipline
during combat and other situations short of declared war by making it
clear that an undeclared war is nonetheless a "time of war" for
purposes of the Uniform Code. It would also shore up any concerns
regarding the due process requirement of adequate notice. It would
insure a maximum degree of uniformity in applying and interpreting
the law by providing notice to military personnel and to civilians
accompanying the military in the field of the suspension of the statute
of limitations, the increased punishments, and the other applications
of the Uniform Code that apply in time of war but not in time of
peace. This would also accommodate the general reluctance of
Congress to issue a formal declaration of war, with its attendant
diplomatic repercussions. Of course, a formal declaration of war by
Congress would also, in and of itself, trigger the "time of war"
330. 54 F. Supp. 252,254 (S.D. Ohio 1944).
331. Id. at 256.
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provisions. As to the formal ending of war, clarity may be provided,
again through an amendment to the Uniform Code and the War
Powers Resolution, by allowing the President to mark the end of war
by revoking the suspension of the Table of Maximum Punishments,
or, in the event of the President's failure or refusal to so act, by
issuance of a Congressional Resolution to that end.
VII. Insurance Cases Construing Whether a State of War
Exists
Many life insurance policies exclude coverage for deaths
occurring while the insured is in military service and is killed in a
"war." The purpose of such clauses is that "[i]t is difficult to
determine the scope of risks assumed by members of the armed
forces in view of the methods of warfare," and that military service in
time of war, "whether in training or combat, is admittedly hazardous,
fraught with incalculable danger.
''11
2
There is a split of authority as to whether an undeclared war
constitutes war for purposes of insurance policy exclusionary clauses.
One line of cases holds to a legalistic, technical construction of the
word "war," while other courts give the word a realistic, pragmatic
interpretation when used in private contracts. Many courts have held
that the provisions of life insurance policies excluding certain death
benefits in the event that the insured dies in the military service "in
time of war" apply to de facto wars. Many other courts have held,
with equal vigor, that the same provisions apply only to a war
officially declared by Congress. Generally speaking, the
interpretation of "war" in insurance contracts will vary, depending on
the contract at issue. An examination of a wide range of insurance
cases pertaining to exclusionary clauses applicable in time of war
indicates that there is a trend for courts to be pragmatic in deciding
whether war exclusion clauses apply. The majority view is that the
existence of actual fighting and other factors short of a formal
declaration of war are sufficient to trigger "time of war" exclusionary
clauses.333 This approach emphasizes that war clauses in insurance
332. Jorgenson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 2, 5 (N.J. 1947)
333. See generally Stinson v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948); N.Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Durham, 166 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1948); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion,
158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946); Gagliormella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246
(D. Mass. 1954); Weisman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
Verano v. De Angelis Coal Co., 41 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1941); Zaccardo v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 124 A.2d 926 (Conn. 1956); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
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contracts are interpreted according to the "ordinary and generally
accepted meaning of war" as distinguished from "war" in its
"technical" or "legal sense."334 At the same time, insurance contracts
are generally construed against the insurance company.335 Those cases
that have found a formal declaration of war to be necessary in order
to trigger a "time of war" clause to deny or restrict compensation for
death or damages seem to emphasize this approach in an effort to
favor the insured.336 Some of these cases sought to permit coverage
under circumstances such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a
day before the United States declared war.337 For example, in Savage
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, the insured, an ensign in the
Navy, died in the attack on Pearl Harbor onDecember 7, 1941."38 The
policy provided for double indemnity for "accidental death by
external, violent and accidental means," except for death resulting
from "war" or an act incident thereto.39 The court held that "war"
does not exist-merely because of an armed attack by the military
forces of another nation-until it is a condition recognized or
accepted by the political authorities of the government that is
attacked, either through an actual declaration of war, which did not
happen until December 8, 1941, or by other acts demonstrating such
position.' The court noted that at the time of the attack the United
Davis, 53 S.E.2d 571 (Ga. App. 1949); Stucker v. Coll. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 208
N.E.2d 731 (Ind. App. 1965); Langlas v. Iowa Life Ins. Co., 63 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa
1954); Dole v. Merchants' Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465 (1863); Gudewicz v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 N.E.2d 900 (Mass. 1954); Stankus v. N.Y. Life Ins.
Co., 44 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1942); Lynch v. Nat. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 278 S.W.2d
32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 98 A.2d 134 (N.J. Super.
1953); Wilkinson v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1956); Vanderbilt v. Traveller's Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54 (1920);
Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 131 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1957); W. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v.
Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1953); Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co., 284 P.2d 287
(Wash. 1955).
334. See Pye, supra note 79, at 46.
335. See, e.g., Bennion, 158 F.2d at 265; Jackson v. N. Am. Assurance Soc'y, 183
S.E.2d 160, 179 (Va. 1971).
336. Harding v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 221 (Pa. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 812 (1953) (Korea); Beley v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953) (Korea); Jackson, 183 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1971) (Vietnam).
337. See, e.g., Savage v. Sun Life Assurance Co. 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La. 1944);
Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 37 Haw. 208 (1945); Rosenau v. Idaho
Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 145 P.2d 227 (Idaho 1944); West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co.,
25 S.E.2d 475 (S.C. 1943).
338. 57 F. Supp. at 620.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 621.
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States and Japan were at peace and, in fact, negotiating for settlement
of their differences by peaceful means, albeit the Japanese were
evidently negotiating deceitfully.341 The court held for the plaintiff.342
In West v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co., another court
considered an substantially similar double indemnity provision with
respect to a navy seaman who also was killed at Pearl Harbor.343 This
insurance policy contained restrictive provisions effective when the
insured was "engaged in military or naval service in time of war."3"
The court, in holding that there was no state of war until Congress
declared it on December 8, 1941, relied upon the definition of war in
Corpus Juris, which states that:
[L]awful war can never exist without the actual concurrence of the
war-making power, but may exist prior to any contest of the armed
forces. The courts are bound by a declaration or determination by
a proper department of government that a war exists, while until
there has been such a declaration or determination the courts
cannot take judicial notice of the existence of a war by their
government.345
In Rosenau v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Association, another court
considered a nearly identical life insurance clause with respect to a
member of the armed services killed in the Pearl Harbor attack.346
The court adhered to the view that the power to declare was is fixed
solely in the Congress, by Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, and
that therefore the attack did not trigger the wartime exclusion.347 In a
dissent, it was pointed out that the President, in addressing Congress
the day after Pearl Harbor, said "I ask that the Congress declare that,
since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday,
December 7, a state of war has existed between the United States and
the Japanese Empire. 31 8 The dissent pointed out that most wars have
been commenced without any formal declaration of war, and that a
war dates from its inception rather than from the time when a formal
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. 25 S.E.2d 475, 476 (S.C. 1943).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 477 (citing Corpus Juris, 67 C.J. 336).
346. 145 P.2d 227, 227-28 (Idaho 1944).
347. Id. at 229.
348. Id. at 234 (Ailshie, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. REC., 77th Cong., vol. 87, pt.
9, at 9505).
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declaration is issued.349 The formal declaration of war by Congress on
December 8, 1941 declared the previous existence of war. That is, it
acknowledged the existence of war which commenced the day before.
As such, it did not constitute a declaration of the commencement of
war, but was an official recognition of a status already existent.
Other cases, sympathetic to this dissent, include New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Bennion, in which the Tenth Circuit held that the
parties to the contract clearly intended for "war" to have a pragmatic
meaning. In Bennion the parties contracted with reference to war
in its real and practical sense, that is, with respect to its hazards to
human life."' Thus, in construing a life insurance policy with respect
to one who died in the attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941,
the court held that war existed on that day, although a declaration of
war did not occur until the next day.352 The court said that the attack
on Pearl Harbor, before the formal declaration of war, was "war or an
act incident thereto" within the meaning of the insurance contract:
When one sovereign nation attacks another with premeditated and
deliberate intent to wage war against it, and that nation resists the
attacks with all force at its command, we have war in the grim sense
of reality. It is war in the only sense that men know and understand
it. Mankind goes no further in his definitive search-he does not
stand on ceremony or wait for technical niceties. To say that courts
must shut their eyes to realities and wait for formalities, is to cut off
the power to reason with concrete facts. We cannot believe that
the courts are deprived of the power to deal with this vital question
in a practical and realistic sense."'
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Durham, the Tenth Circuit
again considered whether a life insurance policy's war provision,
which resulted in a reduced payout, applied.35 ' The policy restricted
the amount payable if the insured's death occured "outside the home
areas while the insured is in the military or naval forces of any
country engaged in war .... '[W]ar' includes undeclared war., 355 This
clause is a "status clause," not a "result clause"; that is, coverage
under the policy depends not upon the cause of death, but upon the
349. Id. at 236 (Ailshie, J., dissenting).
350. 158 F.2d 260, 265 (10th Cir. 1946).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 264.
354. 166 F.2d 874, 875 (10th Cir. 1948).
355. Id.
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status of the decedent when death occurs. The insured was in the
military, and died outside his home area from wholly non-military
causes. The death occurred in September 1945, after the
unconditional surrender of the Germans and Japanese. The question
was whether this country was still engaged in war. The court noted
that:
[Tihere had been no declaration, proclamation or official act of the
executive or legislative departments of the Government declaring,
proclaiming, or otherwise announcing the formal termination of the
existence of a state of war. On the contrary, it was not until
December 31, 1946, that the president of the United States publicly
stated: "Although a state of war still exists, it is at this time possible
to declare, and I find it in the public interest to declare, that
hostilities have terminated. 356
The court noted that it is a political question, solely for the
determination of the political departments of the Government, as to
whether the country was or was not engaged in war at the time the
death occurred . Inasmuch as there had been a political
determination that the country was still at war, the court said it was
conclusively bound by that determination.358 However, the court
noted that under the insurance contract in question the parties had in
mind the risk incident to being engaged in military service in war,
whether declared or undeclared. 9 By including undeclared war in
the policy terms, the contract did not intend for the word "war" to be
used in its technical or formal sense, but "rather in the practical and
realistic sense in which it is commonly used and understood-in the
sense it bears to the hazards to human life."3  Thus, the court held
that "war" under this contract was construed as it is ordinarily
understood and accepted, and in the relationship it bears to the risk
assumed.36  Since the death of the insured occurred after the
unconditional surrender of the enemies, the court held that the
contract would not restrict coverage under these facts.362
Courts were in disagreement as to whether the Korean conflict
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insurance policy provisions. The majority view in state and federal
cases that interpreted insurance contract provisions pertaining to the
Korean War was that the conflict was in fact a Legal War
notwithstanding a lack of formal declaration of war.363 For example,
in Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Insurance Co., the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held that the Korean conflict did not constitute
a "time of war" so that the death of an army soldier was not excluded
by the terms of the life insurance policy.36' The court reasoned that
since Congress has the exclusive power to declare war, and the
"action being waged in Korea" was not declared to be a war by
Congress, the contract plainly would not curtail recovery by the
decedent.365 The court said that there was "merely a dispatch to
Korea by Presidential order of military, naval and air forces of the
United States in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations and the recommendations of the Security Council.
3 66
The court noted that the majority of cases involving life insurance
policies on lives that were lost in the Pearl Harbor attack held that
war did not exist on December 7, 1941, the day of the attack and one
day before Congress issued a declaration of war.3 67 The court added:
A policy of life insurance is a highly technical instrument, drawn up
presumably with meticulous care by legal experts on behalf of the
Insurance Company, and who not only intend to use all terms in
their legal sense but know how to accomplish that result; it may be
assumed, therefore, that if defendant had here meant to invest the
term "war" with a broader connotation than its "constitutional" or
"legal" intendment, it would have effected this by the addition of
words indicating such an intention as, for example, "declared or
undeclared" war.368
One of two dissenters in this case pointed out that in Stankus v.
New York Life Insurance Company, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in considering a similar policy of insurance with
respect to the death of a seaman on a U.S. destroyer, killed when his
363. See Gagliomella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246, 250 (D. Mass.
1954); W. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 261 S.W.2d 554, 560 (Tex. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954). See also 2 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT § 141.1, at 913 (1986).
364. 95 A.2d 202,205-06 (Pa. 1953), cert denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953).
365. Id. at 205.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 206.
368. Id. at 205.
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ship was torpedoed on convoy duty in the Atlantic in October 1941,
prior to Congress declaring war against any nation-held that the
death resulted from war.3 69 The court said:
The term "war" is not limited, restricted or modified by anything
appearing in the policy. It refers to no particular type or kind of
war, but applies in general to every situation that ordinary people
370
would commonly regard as war.
The Beley case was criticized by Stanbery v. Aetna Life Insurance
Co., a New Jersey decision that reached an opposite conclusion.371
That case defined the Korean conflict as a war in its "ordinary, usual
and realistic meaning, viz., actual hostilities between the armed forces
of two or more nations or states de facto or de jure. '3 72 The court said
that to hold that the Korean conflict was not a war would be
"inexplicable and absurd. 373
Another case that construed a wartime exclusionary clause
involved a hijacked commercial jet. In Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a Federal District Court held that
a time of war exclusionary clause did not clearly contemplate damage
resulting from acts of violence by a splinter political group, and
ordered the insurance company to pay $24,288,759 for a plane that




Courts have been equally split in deciding whether a war
exclusion clause applies after there has been a cease fire or formal
surrender of an enemy. Some cases hold that the death of an insured
does not occur during "war" if it happened after the cessation of
actual hostilities but prior to the signing of a peace treaty,375 and other
cases find that war still exists after the formal surrender of an
376
enemy.
369. Stankus v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 44 N.E.2d 687, 689-90 (Mass. 1942).
370. Id. at 688.
371. 98 A.2d 134, 137 (N.J. Super. 1953).
372. Id. at 138.
373. Id.
374. 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1139, 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
375. See Shneiderman v. Metro. Cas. Co. of N.Y., 220 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1961); Beley
v. Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 95 A.2d 202 (Pa. 1953), cert denied, 346 U.S. 820 (1953)
(absence of an official pronouncement of legal termination of a war not essential to
recovery under a life insurance policy excluding liability of one engaged in military
service in "time of war").
376. See Trimble v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 82 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ohio App. 1948).
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As a result of the uncertainty attending the effect of "war"
exclusion clauses, many insurance policies specify that the exclusion
applies to war "declared or undeclared," or by using general language
that refers to being engaged in or employed in connection with
military operations,377 and some exclusionary language might even
extend to cover an officially declared truce of a declared or
undeclared war, at least until a formal peace treaty is signed or a
proclamation of peace issued by the political department of
378government.
VIII. When Does a War Cease to Exist?
A. The Limited Function of an Armistice, Ceasefire or Formal
Surrender
Although the Constitution provides that Congress has the power
to declare war, there is no provision regarding which branch has the
power to terminate war. It has been said that the determination of
when a war terminates is a far more difficult question to answer than
when a war starts.379 The general rule is that the end of a war is
something determined by the political branches of the government,
such as by presidential proclamation. Corollary to this is the principle
that a general armistice or cease-fire does not, in and of itself,
constitute the end of a war.
An armistice, in the law of war, is an agreement between
belligerents that calls for the cessation of military operations by
mutual agreement. An armistice is regarded as a "capitulation," that
is, "a convention stipulating special terms of surrender.""38 A general
armistice may suspend military operations between the belligerents
throughout the world, while a local armistice may suspend military
operations only as between certain parts of the belligerent armies or
with respect to operations in a determined geographic boundary.381 A
general armistice contemplates a complete cessation of all hostilities
for a specified period of time, usually of a considerable duration, or
377. Goodrich v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (1962);
Cohen v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 194 S.E.2d 867, 867 (N.C. App. 1973).
378. Carson v. Equit. Life Assurance Soc'y, 317 A.2d 474, 475 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1973) (insured killed in Vietnam during cease-fire truce).
379. See Hudson, supra note 94, at 1045.
380. 2 LEVIE, supra note 363, at § 141.1.
381. See id. at § 141.2.
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for an indeterminate period. Unless its duration is specified, the
belligerent parties may resume hostilities at any time, provided they
give due warning within the time agreed upon or otherwise comply
with the terms of the armistice.382
An armistice stops the shooting, and is of obvious importance in
that it immediately terminates the hostilities. But it does not imply,
and is not intended to imply, that the war in question is over. It has
been pointed out that "the official termination of the war is usually
not declared until a considerable period after the cessation of actual
hostilities." '383 There is often a long period between an armistice and
the ratification of a treaty of peace, during which war has not yet
ended, though there is no longer a conflict, and though armies have
been demobilized and ships returned to their home ports."
Examining the text of an armistice is the best means of determining
the full import of the agreement and, in particular, whether it can be
regarded as terminating a Legal War. For example, section 60 of the
Korean Armistice Agreement apparently anticipated that a
subsequent political agreement would be implemented to establish
peace:
In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question,
the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the
governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within
three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and
becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both
sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle
through negotiations the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question,
etc.
385
Section 62 of the Agreement stated that the armistice would
remain in effect "until expressly superseded either by mutually
acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an
appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level
between both sides."38 The military commanders in the field did not
consider the war to be over because during the first month following
382. See id.
383. United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232,236 (1954).
384. Eagleton, supra note 13, at 22.
385. Military Armistice in Korea and Temporary Supplementary Agreement, June
27, 1953, § 60, 4 U.S.T. 234, 260. The Korean Armistice Agreement was perhaps the
most detailed armistice agreement in history.
386. Id. at § 62.
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cessation of hostilities pilots and crews were still maintained "at a
high degree of combat readiness in the event hostilities should be
resumed, 3 87 and United Nations' naval forces continued "in position
to counter immediately further aggression or attack."3'8
It is interesting to note that the Paris peace agreement, which
formally ended the Vietnam War, and the Armistice signed on July
27, 1953, which formally ended the Korean War, had distinctly
different provisions. The Paris peace agreement called for a truce at
midnight that day and resulted in the disengagement of American
combat forces in South Vietnam from hostilities with the enemy, the
removal of American combat forces from South Vietnam within sixty
days, and the return home of prisoners of war.89 By comparison, the
Armistice that ended the hostilities of the Korean War did not call for
the removal of all American combat forces from South Korea, and a
considerable number remained there under the United Nations
banner."° But even if their terms are similar or identical, the legal
effect of an armistice and peace accord are completely different. An
armistice ends hostilities; only a peace accord formally ends Legal
War.
With respect to Operation Iraqi Freedom, on May 1, 2003,
President Bush declared an official cessation of major combat, but
over the following two months 25 soldiers were killed in action and
117 wounded.391 About 146,000 troops remained in Iraq as of July 4,
2003,92 at which time the commander of the allied forces in Iraq
stated that "we're still at war.,
393
Ample historical and legal precedent supports the principle that
an armistice does not constitute the end of war but that, instead, one
must refer to some political act of the political branch of government.
For example, the Supreme Court ruled in The Protector that it is
necessary to refer to "some public act of the political departments of
the government to fix the dates" not only of the beginning, but also of
387. 30 Dep't State Bull. 652, 653 (1954).
388. Id. at 92-93.
389. See United States v. Robertson, 1 M.J. 934 (1976).
390. See id. In 1976, the time of the Robertson case, there were 40,000 American
military personnel stationed in South Korea.
391. Amy Waldman, U.S. 'Still At War,' General Declares; 10 GI.'s Wounded,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2003, at Al, A8.
392. Eric Schmitt, After Tour, Senators Warn U.S. Is Spread Thin in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2003, at A10.
393. Waldman, supra note 391, at Al.
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the termination of the Civil War.3 94 The Court held that pursuant to a
presidential proclamation on April 2, 1866, the Civil War had ended
in every Southern state except Texas, and that a second presidential
proclamation on August 20, 1866, ended the war in Texas on that
date.3 9 In 1868, Secretary of State Seward stated: "What period of
suspension of war is necessary to justify the presumption of the
restoration of peace has never yet been settled, and must in every
case be determined with reference to collateral facts and
circumstances. 39 6 In Ribas y Hijo v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that while actual hostilities ceased with respect to the Spanish-
American War on August 12, 1898, a state of war continued until the
ratification of a treaty of peace in April 1899.' 9' In a case construing
the armistice of World War I, Judge Learned Hand stated: "An
armistice effects nothing but a suspension of hostilities; the war still
continues."'3 98
A notable exception to the rule that an armistice marks only the
suspension of hostilities but not the end of a war existed in Turkey up
to the middle of the 18th century. It was Turkey's practice to refrain
from entering peace treaties with Christian states, but to mark the
end of war with Christian states with armistices only, on the
conviction that the Koran forbade making treaties of peace with the
infidels.399
Whether a war begins by formal declaration or otherwise is
irrelevant to establishing the date on which a war ends:
The cases decided following the Civil War indicate clearly that the
determination of the date of termination of a war does not in any
way depend on the manner in which the war commenced-i.e., by
formal declaration or otherwise. [citations omitted.] It follows that
the facts that the Korean war commenced by executive action and
that no declaration of war was ever made, are immaterial for
purposes of determining when the war terminated.
394. The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 702 (1872).
395. See id.
396. 2 U.S. DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 34 (1868).
397. 194 U.S. 315, 323 (1904).
398. Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 255 F. 99, 104 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, Kansas v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 188 (1919). See also Hamilton v. McClaughry,
136 F. 445 (C.C. Kan. 1905) (holding that a cease-fire order or a formal armistice
alone may be insufficient to effect the termination of a war).
399. Philip C. Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate State
Between Peace and War?, 48 AM J. INT'L L. 98,101 (1954).
400. United States v. Smith, 17 C.M.R. 406, 407 (1954).
[Vol. 27:221
Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When Does It End?
Even though it is well-established that an armistice does not, in
itself, mark the end of a war, courts have on occasion interpreted
armistices differently. In some World War I era cases, courts
departed from the traditional view. This occurred despite the fact
that American troops occupied German territory and were not finally
withdrawn until 1923.01 One state court considered whether a soldier
was entitled to an exemption from property tax under a state law that
stated in part: "Every soldier. .. residing in this state who served for
thirty days or more in the army of the United States in any war in
which the United States has been engaged, and received an honorable
discharge.., shall be exempt each year from taxation upon his
taxable property to the value of one thousand dollars."4o" The issue
was whether the plaintiff, who became a soldier on October 21, 1918,
and was honorably discharged on December 10, 1918, had served
thirty days or more during World War I. The court held that the
Armistice of November 11, 1918, marked the end of the war, so that
the soldier had served less than thirty days in the war. It said:
In common thought and understanding the Armistice of November
11, 1918, ended the war. Not only did hostilities then cease,
temporarily, but, as the event shows, permanently as to that war. In
the popular mind it was the definite and complete end. By the
Armistice Germany surrendered to her enemies, as of its day,
practically and effectively on such terms as were then and as might
later be demanded. While the plaintiff remained in military service
after the Armistice his war service was then at an end, as the
ordinary person would say. If in technical aspects a state of war
continued until peace was officially proclaimed, in almost every
practical sense the period was of negotiation and settlement of
terms, and not of actual war.4O3
In United States v. Hicks,4o" a defendant had been convicted of
keeping a house of prostitution on December 7, 1918, under an act of
Congress that directed the Secretary of War to suppress and prevent
the keeping or setting up of houses of ill fame within certain distances
of military camps or stations-a law which by its own terms applied
401. "The court is advised that the period of final return of the American troops
from overseas was fixed by the War Department on March 3, 1923." In re Martinez,
52 Wash. Law Rep. 674 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1924).
402. Lefevre v. Healy, 26 A.2d 681, 682 (N.H. 1942).
403. Id.
404. 256 F. 707,710, 711 (W.D. Ky. 1919).
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only "during the present war. 4 0' 5 The acts charged in the indictment
were committed at least twenty-five days after President Wilson
communicated to the Congress that the war had come to an end. The
court ordered a new trial, stating that:
[W]hile Congress has not itself declared the war to be ended, in its
presence the President-also the commander-in-chief of the
army-did officially communicate to Congress the fact that it "is at
an end" upon the momentous occasion referred to and in the
explicit terms we have given, and information of all the details of
which no doubt reached our entire population, including the person
now under accusation, and all of whom might act upon the
assumption that this official statement of the President was true.
The court noted that war is usually terminated by a treaty of
peace, "and that such treaty is the best evidence of such termination,"
but that there have been:
[M]any instances in which wars were terminated without any treaty
at all. Notably this must be so in domestic wars. So it is also where
a complete conquest of the weaker nation leaves no one authorized
to make a treaty. The public is oftentimes, perhaps generally,
notified of treaties by official proclamation. But there is no
prescribed form for such latter documents, and at last they are but
official announcements of a state of fact. The President's official
communication to Congress met all the conditions of an official
proclamation, so far as such documents are designed for giving
information. It was made on a notable occasion; it was made upon
a theater that attracted the attention of all the people of the United
States, and indeed of the civilized world. The purpose of the
President's oral message being to communicate information, it, if
true, met the requirements of the question before us. Was that
information accurate, or were the facts perverted? Does it now lie
in the mouth of the government, in the prosecution made in its
name, to insist that it was false, even if there is nothing like a
405. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 13, 40 Stat. 76, 83 (1918). The constitutionality
of this statute was upheld. McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919).
406. Hicks, 256 F. at 710-11. The Presidential communication referred to was an
address by President Wilson to Congress on November 11, 1918, only a few hours
after the German army had signed the armistice agreement, in which he declared:
"The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will
be impossible for the German command to renew it." H.R. Doc. No. 1339, at 8
(1918). The Congress itself interpreted the President's words to mean that active
hostilities had ceased but that there was still a technical state of war. See Manley 0.
Hudson, supra note 94, at 1030 n.35.
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technical estoppel? 407
The court concluded that "there is no formal or ceremonious way
agreed upon in international law or otherwise for ending a war., 411 I
think the court may have been persuaded to take this position in light
of another wartime statute passed by Congress, the War-Time
Prohibition Act, which declared illegal the export, import
manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages. ° That Act used
somewhat precise language, extending its ban "until the conclusion of
the present war and thereafter until the termination of
demobilization, the date of which shall be determined and proclaimed
by the President., 4'0  However, the court's use of that Act for
comparative purposes clearly was misplaced. On November 21, 1918,
Congress passed and the President approved the Act. That is, the Act
was enacted after the armistice of November 11, 1918. If Congress
had regarded the armistice as marking the "end of the war," it would
not have referred to "the conclusion of the present war" in the text of
the War-Time Prohibition Act, enacted as it was ten days after the
armistice was declared.
This point was brought into sharper focus by the Supreme Court
in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., which considered whether a
state of war existed with respect to the War-Time Prohibition Act.
4 1 1
The Court held that the Act was in operation after the date of the
armistice:
In view of facts of public knowledge, some of which have been
referred to, that the treaty of peace had not yet been concluded,
that the railways are still under national control by virtue of the war
powers, that other war activities have not been brought to a close,
and that it can not even be said that the man power of the nation
has been restored to a peace footing, we are unable to conclude
that the act has ceased to be valid. 2
In a World War II era case, Lee v. Madigan, the Supreme Court
construed Article 92 of the Articles of War, which provided that "no
person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed
within the geographical limits of the States of the Union and the
407. Hicks, 256 F. at 711.
408. Id.
409. Act of November 21, 1918, ch. 212, 40 Stat. 1045, 1046 (1918).
410. Hicks, 256 F. at 713, (construing Act of November 21, 1918, ch. 212).
411. 251 U.S. 146, 163 (1919).
412. Id.
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District of Columbia in time of peace." '413 The Court noted that:
The Germans surrendered on May 8, 1945 (59 Stat. 1857), the
Japanese on September 2, 1945 (59 Stat. 1733). The President on
December 31, 1946, proclaimed the cessation of hostilities, adding
that "a state of war still exists." 61 Stat. 1048.... The war with
Germany terminated October 19, 1951, by a Joint Resolution of
Congress (65 Stat. 451) and a Presidential Proclamation (66 Stat.
c3). And on April 28, 1952, the formal declaration of peace and
termination of war with Japan was proclaimed by the President (66
Stat. c31), that being the effective date of the Japanese Peace
414Treaty.
The Court held that the date of the charge of murder, June 10,
1949, was "in time of peace" and therefore not subject to court-
martial jurisdiction under the former Article 92.' This apparently
contradicts the Court's decision in Kahn v. Anderson, which
unanimously held that the term "in time of peace" in Article 92
"signifies peace in the complete sense, officially declared., 416
Apparently the Court in Lee believed it was proper to construe the
nation to be at war for one purpose and at peace for other purposes,
and it apparently wanted to "guard jealously against the dilution of
the liberties of the citizen that would result if the jurisdiction of
military tribunals were enlarged at the expense of the civil courts.""41
In the end, the Court simply said, "Whatever may have been the plan
of... Congress in continuing some controls long after hostilities
ceased, we cannot readily assume [that Article 92 would] deny
soldiers or civilians the benefit of jury trials for capital offenses four




In another departure from the political act test, cases that have
interpreted statutes granting benefits to veterans in connection with
World War II have generally construed the term "war" to mean
"actual hostilities. 4 9
413. 358 U.S. 228, 229 (1959) (construing Article of War 92, 10 U.S.C. § 1564 (1946
ed., Supp. IV), which, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Code, governed
proceedings involving charges of murder or rape before courts-martial).
414. Id. at 230.
415. Id. at 236.
416. 255 U.S. 1, 10 (1921).
417. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. at 235.
418. Id. at 236.
419. See, e.g., Kaiser v. Hopkins, 58 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Cal. 1936); Lefevre v. Healy,
26 A.2d 681, 682 (N.H. 1942); State ex rel. Peter v. Listman, 288 Pac. 913, 916 (Wash.
1930).
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In United States v. Shell, the Court of Military Appeals was
presented with the question of whether and when the state of war in
the Korean conflict had come to an end.4 0 The question pertained to
whether the statute of limitations had been suspended with respect to
a charge of absence without leave that commenced on August 4, 1953.
The court adhered to a pragmatic approach, and held that the state of
war had ended before then because of the complete cessation of all
armed conflict in Korea,42 the establishment of a demilitarized zone,
the repatriation of war prisoners, and the change of American
strategy in Korea from repelling aggression to maintaining the status
quo. 2 The court noted that the Korean conflict, while undeclared by
Congress, was a "time of war" so that:
Manifestly, if, in the absence of formal Executive or Legislative
action, a collection of factors compels a conclusion that a state of
war is being maintained, when those factors or a substantial part
thereof no longer exist, a contrary deduction may be required. It is
true, as we indicated in United States v. Sanders, 7 USCMA 21, 21
CMR 147, that various official actions in other governmental
departments were considered to be circumstances touching on the
ultimate issue before us, but they were only straws in the wind
which we used to support our holding in that case, and were not
essential to the decision. There we held that the Korean war had
ended by June 4, 1955, at least, but we did not hold that it had not
terminated before that date.423
The court found that for purposes of military law, the state of
war terminated on the date of the signing of the Korean Armistice,
July 27, 1953.424
Pursuant to its terms "... a complete cessation of all hostilities in
Korea by all armed forces" was accomplished. Armed combat
420. 7 C.M.A. 646 (1957).
421. The court indicated that this factor was of "crucial importance" in all
previous cases in which a state of war had been found to exist. Id. at 651.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 650-51. The case cited by the court in the quoted passage, United States
v. Sanders, 7 C.M.A. 21 (1950), was decided a year earlier and held, in similar fashion,
that a "time of war" situation depends upon the existence of actual armed hostilities.
That court also noted that "many steps have been taken to end the consequences of
the armed conflict" in Korea, that an armistice had existed as of July 27, 1953, that on
February 1, 1955, the President ended the period of eligibility of entitlement to
certain veterans' benefits for soldiers serving in Korea, and that the President had
also terminated certain income tax benefits for those engaged in combat in the
region. United States v. Sanders, 7 C.M.A. at 22.
424. United States v. Shell, 7 C.M.A. at 651.
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ended and battlefield conditions ceased; there was no more
shooting and there was no more battle casualties; a Demarcation
Line and Demilitarized Zone were established; and war prisoners
were repatriated. Assessing the situation existing as of that time,
we note the absence of may of those factors upon which we
predicated our previous holdings that we were at war. Thereafter,
it was no longer necessary to provide the logistical support essential
to maintain combat operations in terms of both quality and
quantity. American troops no longer had to be rotated to equalize
combat duties. Patrolling, while no doubt still intensive, no longer
was aimed at penetration into enemy territory. A buffer zone was
established to prevent just that sort of activity. The kind of medical
support required in a combat situation no longer had to be
furnished. Last, and perhaps most important, the whole theory
upon which the presence of our troops in Korea was premised
changed with the signing of the Armistice. We were no longer
there to repel aggression; thereafter our mission was to maintain a
peaceful status quo. Our military situation was that of immediate
readiness, not armed conflict.42'
The Supreme Court reiterated the political act test for
determining when a war has ceased to exist in Ludecke v. Watkins,
another World War II era case. 426 This involved a writ of habeas
corpus by a German resident who contested the President's authority,
under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 (which has remained essentially
unchanged since its enactment), 427 to order the removal from the
425. Id.
426. 355 U.S. 160 (1948).
427. Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 57, R.S. § 4067 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §
21). The Act reads:
Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign
nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated,
attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any
foreign nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation
of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or
government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be
within the United States and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be
apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The
President is authorized, in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or
other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the
United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the manner and
degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject and in what cases, and
upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the
removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United
States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other
regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for the public
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United States of all alien enemies "who shall be deemed by the
Attorney General to be dangerous to the public peace and safety of
the United States. 4 28 The Act empowers the President to deport
enemy aliens in time of war.429 The petitioner claimed that the order
of his deportation was unlawful because there had been a formal
proclamation of the cessation of hostilities of World War II by the
President on December 31, 1946. The Court first upheld the
constitutionality of the Act, and then said that the wording of the
statute makes it clear that Congress intended for it to bar judicial
review. 430  However, the Court went on to consider whether the
President's powers under the Act survived the actual cessation of the
hostilities of World War II. The Court held, in an opinion by Justice
Frankfurter, that "War does not cease with a cease-fire order, and
power to be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the
Act of 1798 is a process which begins when the war is declared but is
not exhausted when the shooting stops. ',431 A war "may be
432
terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential proclamation.
safety.
Id.
428. Proclamation 2677, 10 Fed. Reg. 8947. (July 14, 1945).
429. See 50 U.S.C. § 21.
430. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. at 164-65.
431. Id. at 168 (citing; Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 167 (1919);
McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 438 (1880); The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
700 (1872); and United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 56, 70 (1869)).
432. President Andrew Johnson believed that he had the power to officially end
the Civil War by Presidential proclamation. Hudson, supra note 94, at 1033 n.45.
However, President Wilson stated in an informal conference at the White House that
he did not believe he had the power to proclaim a state of peace with respect to
World War I. See id. at 1033. The Congress apparently believed that it was its
prerogative to determine the date of the termination of the war.
A public debate of sorts arose in 1920 as to whether the Congress or the
President had the power to declare the war to be officially at an end. A resolution in
the House of Representatives in the early months of 1920 recited that, whereas the
President had advised that the war against Germany had ended, the state of war was
declared to be at an end for such purposes as applying wartime legislation. A
majority of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs declared it "the plain duty of
Congress to declare the admitted fact that the war is ended," while the minority
stated that Congress did not have the power "to declare peace by joint resolution"
inasmuch as "the method of making peace is by treaty," and that treaty-making was
"essentially an executive, diplomatic function." Id. Congress ended up passing a
joint resolution stating that the "state of war is hereby declared at an end." However,
the President vetoed the resolution on May 27, 1920, and the House failed to
override his veto. Id. See also Edward S. Corwin, 18 MICH. L. REV. 669 (1920); John
M. Mathews, The Termination of War, 19 MICH. L. REV. 819 (1921); Charles S.
Thomas, The Power of Congress to Establish Peace, 55 AM. L. REV. 86 (1921). Later,
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Whatever the mode, its termination is a political act." '433 The Court
quoted a case handed down only a few months earlier in which it said,
regarding the cessation of hostilities in World War II: "We have
armies abroad exercising our war power and have made no peace
terms with our allies, not to mention our principal enemies.
434
In dissent, Justice Black, pointed out that the U.S. Department
of State declared, on June 5, 1945, that the German armed forces had
completely capitulated and unconditionally surrendered: "'There is
no central Government or authority in Germany capable of accepting
responsibility for the maintenance of order, the administration of the
country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious
Powers. '' 435  The State Department further stated that the United
States, Russia, Great Britain and France had assumed "'supreme
authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed
by the German Government, the High Command, and any state,




In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court held that World




The political act test for determining whether a state of war
continues to exist and, if it has ended, when it ended, as enunciated in
Ludecke v. Watkins, has generally been followed.38 It is precedent for
the principle that war does not end with the cessation of hostilities in
and of itself, but that a formal proclamation or peace treaty is
necessary to establish that a war has in fact come to an end in the
legal sense.
In Waller v. United States, the Court of Claims considered
whether the Treasury Department had the authority, on July 1, 1946,
on July 2, 1921, the President approved a joint resolution of Congress that stated the
war "is hereby declared at an end." Hudson, supra note 94, at 1035.
433. Watkins, 335 U.S. at 168-69.
434. Id. at 169 (citing Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 147 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
435. Id. at 177-78 (Black, J., dissenting).
436. Id. at 178 (Black, J., dissenting) (citing 12 Dep't State Bull. 1051).
437. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 546 (1950).
438. For an extensive list of lower court cases that have generally held, for the
purpose of applying various federal statutes, that a war continues to exist until such
time as peace is declared and approved by congressional action and by the
appropriate representative authority of the foreign country, see Pye, supra note 79, at
53 n.57. It should be noted that in the context of war exclusion or restriction clauses
under insurance contracts, courts have generally held that a war ends upon the
"cessation of hostilities." Id.
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to modify a certain petroleum products contract to allow additional
payments to the contractor under the authority of the First War
Powers Act, if it "would facilitate the prosecution of the war., 439 The
court held that the war had not ended and that the Treasury
Department therefore still had the discretion to modify the contract
at issue:
No treaty of peace has been signed with either Germany or Japan,
our troops were in occupation of these countries in whole or in
part, and the administration of their government affairs were either
wholly or in part subject to the control of our forces. It cannot be
said that the war is over so long as the enemy countries are
occupied with our troops.440
Similarly, in Kahn v. Anderson," a World War I era case, the
Supreme Court held that a soldier could be tried for murder before a
court martial on November 25, 1918, notwithstanding the signing of
the Armistice on November 11, 1918, and notwithstanding the
provision of the Articles of War that "No person shall be tried by
court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical
limits of the States of the Union and the District of Columbia in time
of peace.""12 The Court said: "That complete peace, in the legal sense,
had not come to pass by the effect of the Armistice and the cessation
of hostilities, is not disputable."" 3  The Court added that the
expression "in time of peace" used in the Articles of War referred to
a "complete peace" which "in the legal sense, had not come to pass by
the effect of the Armistice and the cessation of hostilities."'
Judge Learned Hand similarly adhered to the traditional view
that an armistice does not mark the close of the war, in Commercial
Cable Co. v. Burleson, a case involving an act of Congress that
authorized the President to take possession and control of telegraph
and marine cables during the continuation of war." The court held
that while the armistice occurred on November 11, 1918, a state of
war still existed because only a treaty of peace, not an armistice, ends
439. 78 F. Supp. 816, 817 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (referring to section 201 of the First War
Powers Act of December 18, 1941, 50 U.S.C. app. § 611). See also Bowles v.
Ormesher Bros., 65 F. Supp. 791 (D. Neb. 1946).
440. Waller v. United States, 78 F. Supp. at 818.
441. 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
442. Id. at 9 (referring to Art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 1564) (emphasis added).
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. 255 F. 99, 104 (S.D.N.Y.), decree rev'd as moot, 250 U.S. 360 (1919).
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a war:
An armistice effects nothing but a suspension of hostilities; the war
still continues. It is true that a war may end by the cessation of
hostilities, or by subjugation; but that is not the normal course, and
neither had the hostilities ceased, nor had the enemy been
subjugated in the sense in which that term is used. There were still
military operations, the armistice had not been carried out, and
after it was, armed forces of the United States were in occupation
of enemy territory, and were in European and Asiatic Russia,
where, indeed, they still remain. The President was still in
command of these forces, and to their conduct telegraphic
communication was still essential. All that the armistice could do
was to introduce a new, though very vital, consideration into his
decision; but it did not affect its finality."6
The difficulty with adhering to the traditional view that only a
peace treaty or similar formal proclamation, but not an armistice or
cease-fire, marks the end of a war, is that sometimes undeclared wars
end with no formal peace treaty ever being established. Still, we want
to be able to say that such wars have definitively ended. For instance,
while a truce occurred with respect to the war between Mexico and
Texas in 1843, and future negotiations were anticipated, no final
peace plan was ever agreed upon."7  Similarly, the war between
Prussia and Liechtenstein ceased in 1866, but there was no formal
peace treaty, and the war eventually was considered over by the mere
cessation of hostilities."'  As mentioned above with respect to the
U.S. Naval Operations Against France (1798-1801), in 1801, the U.S.
Senate ratified a Convention that resolved the dispute, but the
document was not regarded as a peace treaty. Also, as mentioned
above, in September 1901, the parties engaged in the Boxers Uprising
446. Id. at 105. The court cited 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 231
(1912):
Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term, are all agreements
between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. They are
in no wise to be compared with peace, and ought not to be called temporary
peace, because the condition of war remains between the belligerents
themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals on all points beyond
the mere cessation of hostilities. In spite of such cessation the right of visit
and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact, as does
likewise the right to capture neutral vessels attempting to break the
blockade, and the right to seize contraband of war.
447. See Pye, supra note 79, at 59.
448. See id. (citing Charles C. Tansill, Termination of War by Mere Cessation of
Hostilities, 38 L.Q. REV. 26, 32, 36 (1922)).
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signed what they specifically characterized was not a peace treaty, but
a "Final Protocol." Similarly the Joint Blockade by Germany, Great
Britain and Italy against Venezuela in 1902-1903 was settled by
mediation, but no peace treaty.
There is a certain intuitive appeal to the pragmatic approach,
embodied by United States v. Shell and United States v. Sanders, that if
the consequences of actual hostilities are no longer present, war no
longer exists. In the case of the Korean conflict, there was no formal
peace plan as late as 1956. Yet there was a complete cessation of all
armed conflict in Korea, the establishment of a demilitarized zone
and the repatriation of war prisoners. The President had ordered a
substantial reduction of armed forces in the region, terminated
income tax benefits which had applied to soldiers engaged in the Far
East and ended the period of eligibility of certain veterans' benefits
with respect to soldiers participating in the Korean conflict.
Furthermore, the United Nations military forces ceded administrative
control to the Republic of Korea, while the Department of the Navy
terminated its authorization of the National Defense Service Medal
and the Korean Service Medal-which had been authorized for
soldiers engaged in the Korean conflict. ' 9
IX. Conclusion
If we were to denominate as war all foreign actions in which U.S.
military forces have been engaged, we would have to conclude that
the United States has practically never been at peace in the history of
our country. As early as 1800, in Bas v. Tingy,"50 courts have
attributed minimal significance to a formal declaration of war. And
clearly it is the case today that a formal declaration of war is not
necessary to establish that a state of Legal War exists that would alter
the relations between states and trigger "time of war" provisions of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Perhaps the only function that
uniquely remains for a formal declaration of war is "that of a solemn
act of state which serves as a means of arousing popular support at
home and abroad and which is usually reserved for extreme cases.
' 451
But when there is no declaration of war, no authorizing resolution
from Congress and the parties to a conflict deny that a state of war
exists, it remains problematic as to whether and precisely when "war"
449. Pye, supra note 79, at 57-58.
450. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 45 (1800).
451. Note, supra note 80, at 1772.
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provisions of military law and of insurance contracts kick in.
Despite occasional judicial attempts to discover a unique, general
legal definition [of war] applicable in all contexts, it seems clear
that no verbal formula can identify one class of armed hostilities as
properly subject to rules and considerations wholly different from
those applicable to other classes. At best "war" will assume
different meanings depending on the context which prompts the
investigation, whether it be the interpretation of a contract, a life
452insurance policy, a statute, or a constitution.
Compounding the problem is the fact that the Supreme Court
has held that "Congress in drafting laws may decide that the Nation
may be 'at war' for one purpose, and 'at peace' for another. It may
use the same words broadly in one context, narrowly in another." '453
There are various types of acts or announcements short of a formal
declaration of war that can be interpreted as evidence of a state of
war. Generally, any act of hostility that results in a state of war can
be construed to be an ipso facto declaration of war.
From the discussions set forth in this article, it is clear that court-
martials have arrived at varying conclusions under similar facts as to
whether wartime status existed, and that military courts construe
"time of war" on an ad hoc basis. The question of whether a "time of
war" exists lacks a consistent method of interpretation, making it
difficult to predict when a period will be considered wartime. In
addition, the scope of appellate review is limited to a determination
of whether the military gave a fair consideration to each of the
petitioner's constitutional claims 4  Moreover, there is little clarity in
the Uniform Code itself as to precisely when, and over what
geographic scope, a "time of war" exists. Compounding the difficulty
is the fact that military decisions generally reflect a bias for the
military and for military jurisdiction.455  This contributes to
452. Id. at 1774.
453. Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228,231 (1959).
454. See, e.g., King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1970). This approach has
been criticized by various commentators. See Donald S. Burris & David Anthony
Jones, Civilian Courts and Courts-Martial-The Civilian Attorney's Perspective, 10
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 139 (1971); Donald T. Weckstein, Federal Court Review of
Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and Military
Responsibility, 54 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1971); Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas
Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1208-36 (1970).
455. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,264-65 (1969).
The presiding officer at a court-martial is not a judge whose objectivity and
independence are protected by tenure and undiminishable salary and
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uncertainty for those who wish to know, in advance, whether a
wartime offense has or has not been committed. Given that it was the
judgment of Congress that offenses are more serious and morally
blameworthy when committed in time of war than in peacetime, and
that the suspension of the statute of limitations provides a form of
increased deterrence, it would seem to be important for individuals to
be able to identify when and where a "time of war" exists.
While courts have generally deferred to the political branches of
government on the question of whether a state of war exists, courts
have also fashioned outcomes based on a common sense approach
when they have seen fit to do so. This "objective" approach, in some
instances, has had the effect of overriding official pronouncements of
the political branches.
As developed in this article, it becomes particularly problematic
to determine whether a technical state of war exists when these
factors are present: (1) there is no formal declaration by Congress, no
other resolution that acknowledges a state of war and no Tonkin-type
resolution that authorizes presidential action; (2) casualties occur, but
in relatively small numbers; (3) troops are committed but not nearly
at a level approaching full capacity; (4) expenditures are significant
but not high enough to burden the national economy; and (5) other
elements are present that fall short of a full-blown state of war, such
as actions to quell uprisings or to liberate oppressed groups, defensive
actions by troops in peace-keeping missions in response to attacks by
irregular combatants or guerilla forces and deployments to liberate
oppressed groups or to join forces with local armed forces for the
purpose of combating terrorists or other irregular combatants.
Clearly, when Congress makes a straightforward declaration of
war, as happened with respect to both World Wars, there is no
question but that the "time of war" provisions of the Uniform Code
fall into place. But where there is no explicit declaration of war456 or
Executive Order pertaining to suspension of the Table of Maximum
nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer.... [T]he
suggestion of the possibility of influence.., by the officer who convenes it,
selects its members, and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has
direct command authority over its members is a pervasive one in military
law.... A court-martial ... remains to a significant degree a specialized part
of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.
Id.
456. See discussion of Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, supra note 126, and
accompanying text.
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Punishments, it is left to the military courts to decide whether the
"time of war" provisions apply. In such cases, courts may take a
pragmatic approach, and determine that the "time of war" provisions
are operative, but this ad hoc method produces inconsistent results.
Also as developed in this article, in the context of life insurance
policies there has been a significant split of authority in defining
"war." 457 This is unhelpful to consumers who often enough do not
read fine print and, at any rate, cannot predict whether exclusionary
clauses may apply to certain situations, as was seen in the various
cases that arose out of the Pearl Harbor attack.
Establishing a uniform set of criteria that would define when a
state of war exists can serve several useful purposes. Presently, when
military operations are of the type that tradition holds fall short of
war-such as peace-keeping missions or interventions to quell civil
unrest abroad-it is unclear whether the "time of war" provisions of
the Uniform Code apply. In such contexts, military commanders may
have too wide a latitude in deciding, one way or the other, whether
the jus in bello rules under the Geneva Convention of 1949 relating to
prisoners of war and other terms apply to the conflict. A uniform set
of criteria to establish whether a state of war exists would also make it
clear that the laws of war provide legal protection to the populations
impacted by the conflict. Domestically, it could furnish authority for
legislative or executive acts which depend on the existence of war. It
could also furnish a guide for domestic court action in the
interpretation of contracts that contain war exclusion clauses in life
insurance contracts and other civil contexts. Internationally, it could
furnish notice to neutral states of the coming into force of a different
legal status, with its consequent variation of rights and duties, and it
could fix the exact time at which this new legal status is considered to
go into effect, for the benefit of neutral states and their citizens. It
would make it easier for governments and courts to deal with the
exercise of prize jurisdiction. Finally, it would also give greater
certainty of the status of military operations or other missions carried
out with the authority of an organ of the United Nations.
457. For an illustration of the difficulties of defining "war" in the context of life
insurance policies, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in N.Y. Life Ins. Co.
v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946).
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